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ABSTRACT 
THE RELATIVE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL ANALYST FORECAST 
REVISIONS ON SECURITY PRICES 
SEPTEMBER 1986 
ELIZABETH A. STROCK, B.B.A., COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Directed by: Professor Thomas Schneeweis 
Financial analyst forecasts are a principal source of information 
on expected firm earnings. Analyst forecast revisions, therefore, 
have often been used to test how forecasts of firm earnings are used 
by market participants. This study examines the impact of revisions 
made by alternative financial analyst sources on security prices in 
1980 and 1981. Various consensus and individual analyst sources are 
evaluated in an effort to identify the analyst source that most 
closely approximates market expectations. Alternative research 
designs are also examined in order to address measurement issues 
raised in previous studies that use analyst forecasts. Empirical 
results indicate that the "1-Month Mean” consensus source and the 
"All-American*1 analyst source provide better proxies for market 
expectations than other sources examined in this study. In addition, 
the association between analyst revisions and security returns is 
found to be sensitive to the holding period used, the revision 
deflator employed and the test period examined. 
This study also investigates the marginal information content of 
an analyst’s revisions over and above the revisions of a market- 
vi 
leading analyst within an industry group. The empirical results are 
consistent with the existence of market leading and lagging analysts 
and with investors using the revisions of more than one analyst to 
fully adjust security prices. 
Finally, characteristics of the available analyst sources are 
examined in an effort to explain the differential security price 
reaction to the forecast revisions of alternative financial analysts. 
The results of this study suggest that the price response to an 
analyst revision is significantly related to the fiscal quarter in 
which the revision is made but is unrelated to measures of forecast 
uniqueness and analyst reputation. 
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Financial analyst forecasts of firm earnings are one information 
source that can be used by market participants to determine 
equilibrium security prices. Several recent studies explore the 
relationship between earnings forecasts made by financial analysts and 
stock market behavior. Givoly and Lakonishok [1979], Abdel-khalik and 
Ajinkya [1982], and Imhoff and Lobo [1984] report significant security 
price response to analyst forecast revisions in the time period of the 
revision. Their results suggest that information on earnings 
forecasts is used by investors in forming earnings expectations. 
Furthermore, Imhoff and Lobo [1984] demonstrate that analyst forecasts 
complement management forecasts in those periods when management 
publicly releases earnings forecasts, and act as substitutes in 
periods when management does not issue public forecasts.^ 
These empirical findings suggest that investors use at least two 
sources of earnings forecasts in their valuation process—management 
forecasts and financial analyst forecasts. These two forecast 
sources, however, are different in nature. For an individual firm, 
management officials typically provide a single earnings forecast near 
the end of the fiscal year. Alternatively, many financial analysts 
may follow a particular firm and provide numerous earnings forecasts 
that are continuously updated throughout the fiscal year. 
Consequently, there are many alternative sources of financial analyst 
1 
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forecasts of earnings. 
The first objective of this study is to compare alternative 
analyst sources on the basis of information content in order to 
determine which source provides the best proxy for market 
expectations. While financial analyst sources have been used to 
measure earnings expectations in accounting and financial research, 
analysts have been evaluated individually in some studies and 
collectively in other studies. As a result, there is little agreement 
among previous studies on the source whose forecasts should be used to 
proxy for market earnings expectations. 
In recent earnings studies, consensus sources are the most 
commonly used analyst source. Imhoff and Lobo [1984] and Elton, 
Gruber and Gultekin [1981], for example, combine the forecasts of 
numerous individual analysts and examine mean or consensus forecasts 
in their analyses. These studies, therefore, evaluate the forecasts 
of financial analysts as a group. 
An advantage of using a consensus forecast to proxy for market 
expectations is that all analyst forecasts that are presumably 
available to investors are included in the consensus. In this manner, 
none of the analyst forecasts that may be used by investors are 
excluded from a measure of expected earnings. In addition, Imhoff and 
Lobo [1984] note that consensus forecasts may be more accurate than 
the forecasts of an individual analyst because individual analyst 
forecast errors of opposite sign will cancel when combined to form a 
consensus forecast. 
3 
The potential limitations of a consensus measure as a proxy for 
expected earnings, however, have been noted by other researchers. 
Jennings [1985] suggests that "out-of-date” individual forecasts may 
be included in the consensus measure. These forecasts may not be used 
by investors and may, therefore, reduce the appropriateness of a 
consensus measure as a proxy for market expectations. Givoly and 
Lakonishok [1979] note that consensus revisions change slowly over 
time, resulting from a lag between the first analyst forecast revision 
and the revisions of the remaining analysts. Because investors’ 
expectations of earnings are primarily affected by the release of the 
first revision if the market is efficient, Givoly and Lakonishok 
[1979] conclude that consensus revisions may underestimate the true 
change in market expectations. 
These criticisms of consensus measures suggest that some 
forecasts may be more closely followed by investors than others, 
dependent on the timing of the forecasts. The individual analyst 
providing an initial forecast revision that is more closely followed 
than subsequent revisions is the "market leader", as denoted by Givoly 
and Lakonishok [1979]. A market leader produces forecast revisions 
that provide new information to the financial community which is used 
by investors and may be reproduced in the subsequent revisions of the 
remaining analysts or "followers". Because there may be more than one 
analyst providing new information, several analysts may be considered 
market leaders. While no study has classified individual analysts as 
leaders and followers, the existence of a market-leading analyst or 
analysts has been supported by Givoly and Lakonishok [1979] and Brown, 
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Foster and Noreen [1985] who find positive serial correlation in 
consensus measures of analyst forecasts. 
In light of the potential existence of a market-leading analyst, 
Gonedes, Dupoch and Penman [1976], and Givoly and Lakonishok [1979] 
use the forecasts of a single analyst in place of consensus forecasts. 
In these studies, the individual analyst source is identified using 
alternative selection criteria based on various analyst 
characteristics that are believed to distinguish a market-leading 
analyst from the rest of the analyst community. Gonedes, Dupoch and 
Penman [1976] examine the timeliness of each analyst’s forecasts and 
select the analyst providing the first earnings forecast in the test 
period. Alternatively, Givoly and Lakonishok [1979] evaluate the 
forecast activity of each of the individual analysts and use the 
earnings forecasts of the ’’most active" analyst. 
Previous studies have, therefore, varied in their use of 
consensus and individual analyst sources to measure market earnings 
expectations. Studies employing individual analyst forecasts have 
also differed in the criterion used to isolate one analyst from the 
set of analysts providing earnings forecasts for a sample firm. In 
light of these research design variations, the first part of this 
study evaluates alternative analyst sources that have been used in 
previous studies. Eight consensus sources and three individual 
analyst sources are compared on the basis of the information content 
of their forecast revisions. 
Each of the three individual analyst sources examined in the 
first part of this analysis are identified using a single selection 
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criterion that is believed to distinguish a market-leading analyst 
from the remaining set of analysts. These selection criteria have 
been suggested in previous empirical studies and evaluate certain 
analyst characteristics. By using these three criteria, however, only 
a subset of analysts for a given firm are evaluated as potential 
market leaders. In addition, use of the same selection criterion for 
all sample firms may be overly restrictive. For example, the analyst 
characteristic that distinguishes a market-leading analyst from other 
analysts may vary across firms or across industries. As an 
alternative to these three selection criteria, therefore, the second 
part of this study more formally identifies a market-leading analyst 
by considering all available analysts in a given industry and using 
information content as the criterion. The analyst whose revisions are 
most closely associated with security price movements around the 
revision date is identified as a market leader for the industry. 
The second issue addressed in this study uses the identified 
market leaders to examine the marginal information content of other 
analysts' revisions over and above the revisions of a market-leading 
analyst. Presently, the marginal information content of earnings 
forecasts made by different analysts has not been examined. By using 
consensus forecasts or an individual analyst's forecasts as proxies 
for market expectations, previous studies have assumed that investors 
use analyst forecast information either in aggregate form or on an 
individual basis. It is unclear, however, which of these two extreme 
assumptions best describes how investors use the numerous analyst 
earnings forecasts available for each firm. Furthermore, it may be 
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more likely that market participants obtain information from a subset 
of analysts or industry specialists, thereby following some analysts 
more closely than others but using the forecast revisions of more than 
one analyst to determine the appropriate price adjustment. By 
evaluating the marginal information content of alternative analyst 
forecasts, this study provides empirical evidence on the manner in 
which investors use multiple sources of analyst information. 
To further compare the revisions of alternative analysts, the 
third part of this study empirically tests whether the magnitude of 
security price reaction to an analyst revision is associated with 
analyst characteristics. Market response to the revisions of some 
analysts may be more pronounced than the response to the revisions of 
other analysts. Previous studies suggest that the differential market 
response to forecast revisions may be related to the relative 
uniqueness of the forecast revision (Givoly and Lakonishok [1979]), 
differences in analysts’ reputation (Abdel-Khalik and Ajinkya [1982]) 
and the relative timing of the forecast revision (Richards and Martin 
[1979] and Imhoff and Lobo [1985]). While these characteristics are 
believed to explain differential stock price reaction to analyst 
revisions, few direct tests have been conducted. In this analysis, 
the relationship between security prices and proxies for these three 
analyst characteristics is measured and evaluated. 
This study examines alternative analyst sources and alternative 
analyst characteristics in an effort to better measure the 
relationship between earnings forecast revisions and security prices. 
In addition to the use of different analyst sources as proxies for 
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market expectations, previous studies using analyst earnings forecasts 
have also varied on other research design issues. These studies have 
incorporated alternative earnings variable measures, various security 
return measures, different holding period lengths and alternative 
subsample classifications. Presently, there is little empirical 
evidence on how these research design variations affect the inferences 
drawn about the relationship between analyst revisions and security 
returns. A final focus of this study, therefore, is to assess the 
impact of these measurement issues on analyst forecast studies. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. 
Chapter II reviews the body of literature relating to the association 
of analyst forecasts and security prices. The three research 
hypotheses of this study and the methodology used to test these 
hypotheses are described in Chapter III. Chapter IV discusses the 
results related to these hypotheses. Chapter V summarizes the 
conclusions and implications of this study and provides suggestions 
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2.1 Motivation for Examining Earnings Forecast Revisions 
There is both empirical and theoretical support for the extensive 
research interest in accounting earnings numbers as an important 
information source in financial markets. Malkiel and Cragg [1970] 
show that variables based on earnings numbers are strongly significant 
in cross-section valuation models which examine the relationship 
between price-earnings ratios and accounting variables. Furthermore, 
Beaver, Kettler and Scholes [1970] provide evidence that market-based 
measures of systematic risk are most highly associated with earnings 
variables. 
Ohlson [1979] and Garman and Ohlson [1980] provide a theoretical 
framework for the relationship between earnings and security prices. 
Ohlson [1979] suggests that there exists an information link between 
accounting data and the future stream of benefits from an equity 
investment, as well as a valuation link between the future benefits 
and security price. These two links form a three variable chain: 
accounting data—benefits—security price. Furthermore, Garman and 
Ohlson [1980] suggest that whatever information is useful in 
forecasting future benefits affects the current equilibrium value of 
securities. Over time, therefore, changes in such information will 
accordingly result in value changes. By measuring the association 
between changes in earnings numbers and changes in security prices one 
is empirically examining the mapping from the endpoints of this 
9 
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"accounting data—benefits—price" chain. 
The information content of earnings has been directly tested in 
many financial and accounting studies originating with the seminal 
work of Ball and Brown [1968]. Empirical studies in this area measure 
the association between security returns and a firm's unexpected 
earnings to determine the extent to which earnings numbers are used by 
market participants. The measure of unexpected earnings, however, has 
varied across empirical studies due to alternative proxies for market 
expectations of firm earnings. For example, univariate time-series 
models, time-series models using economic data, Box-Jenkins 
time-series models, management forecasts and financial analyst 
forecasts have all been used to estimate expected earnings (Ball and 
Brown [1968], Chant [1980], Foster [1977], Patell [1976] and Givoly 
and Lakonishok [1979]). 
In more recent studies, Fried and Givoly [1982] and Brown, 
Griffin, Hagerman and Zmijewski [1984a] show that unexpected earnings 
measures are more highly associated with risk-adjusted returns when 
financial analyst earnings forecasts are used to estimate expected 
annual earnings than when various extrapolative and Box-Jenkins 
time-series models are used. These results suggest security analyst 
forecasts are the best single proxy for expected earnings. While both 
these studies support the use of analyst forecasts, their empirical 
tests use only one earnings forecast provided at a specific point in 
time for each firm. Fried and Givoly [1982], for example, use the 
annual earnings consensus forecast made after the first fiscal 
quarter. This selected forecast is subtracted from the actual annual 
11 
earnings to estimate unexpected earnings. Similarly, Brown, Griffin, 
Hagerman and Zmijewski [1984a] use one earnings forecast per quarter 
in their empirical tests. By using only one forecast in a given time 
period, however, these studies disregard any updates in the analysts 
forecasts (and, therefore, in market expectations) that are made after 
the time of the selected forecast. Revisions in analyst forecasts 
presumably reflect the analyst's reaction to the receipt of new 
information and, therefore, provide more timely signals to the market 
than annual or quarterly earnings reports. 
The continuous revision process utilized by analysts has 
motivated many researchers to use financial analyst forecast revisions 
as timely sources of financial information (e.g. Abdel-khalik and 
Ajinkya [1982], Imhoff and Lobo [1984] and Brown, Foster and Noreen 
[1985]). It is unclear, however, which is the most appropriate 
analyst source to use. With the large number of analysts providing 
earnings forecasts, previous empirical studies have differed in their 
choice of the most timely analyst forecast source. 
2.2 Use of Consensus Sources 
With the increased availability of consensus measures, many 
studies (e.g. Elton, Gruber and Gultekin [1981], Imhoff and Lobo 
[1984], and Kerrigan [1984]) use the forecasts derived from a monthly 
composite measure. These measures have typically been obtained from 
secondary sources such as the Lynch, Jones and Ryan Institutional 
Brokers Estimate System (IBES), Standard and Poor's Earnings 
Forecaster and Icarus Service of Zacks Investment Research, Inc 1 
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Because IBES summary data is presently available on machine readable 
tapes, this source has received growing use in the accounting and 
financial literature. Consequently, the mean of all outstanding 
analyst forecasts provided by IBES is often used as the consensus 
forecast of earnings. 
One reason for using a consensus forecast as a proxy for market 
expectations is that a consensus earnings forecast may be more 
accurate than an individual analyst's earnings forecast. By 
aggregating the forecasts of several analysts, the consensus forecast 
error may be reduced due to the cancellation of analyst forecast 
errors of opposite sign. In an empirical study, Coggin and Hunter 
[1982-83] demonstrate that the mean square error of a consensus 
earnings forecast is significantly less than the sum of the mean 
squared errors of several analyst forecasts. While Coggin and Hunter 
[1982-83] provide evidence that consensus forecast errors are smaller 
than the sum of individual analysts' forecast errors, these authors do 
not compare consensus forecast errors to the forecast errors made by a 
single analyst. As a result, there is presently no empirical evidence 
on the accuracy of consensus earnings forecasts relative to the 
forecasts of a single analyst. 
In addition to this accuracy issue, the relative information 
content of consensus earnings forecasts and individual analyst 
forecasts has not been examined. Even if consensus forecasts are 
superior to individual analyst forecasts on the basis of ex post 
accuracy tests, they may be inferior on the basis of association with 
stock price movement. This study examines the information content of 
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consensus forecast revisions and the forecast revisions of individual 
analysts in order to more directly compare these sources as proxies 
for market expectations of earnings. 
Another issue associated with consensus measures is the 
appropriate weighting scheme. Consensus measures that apply equal 
weight to each outstanding forecast may overweight outlying or extreme 
forecasts that have less impact on market expectations or underweight 
the forecasts of an analyst more closely followed by market 
participants. In addition, an equal-weighted consensus measure may 
include outdated forecasts that investors do not use when forming 
expectations. 
Brown, Foster and Noreen [1985] compare two consensus measures, 
the IBES mean and IBES median, and report that the association between 
earnings measures and security prices is insensitive to the definition 
of consensus.^ This finding suggests that applying less weight to 
outlying forecasts (by using a median instead of a mean) does not 
improve the consensus forecast as a proxy for market expectations. A 
limitation of the Brown, Foster and Noreen study, however, is that the 
authors examine only one alternative weighting scheme that may still 
include outdated forecasts. 
There has been increased interest in the effect of outdated 
forecasts on analysis of consensus measures. As noted by Harris 
[1986], 
...there remains potential difficulties in using IBES data 
to the extent that some analysts ... fail to continually 
review and revise their earnings estimates.^ 
Despite the increased use of analyst data, few tests have examined the 
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degree to which outdated forecasts are included in consensus measures. 
The impact of such inclusion on the use of a consensus measure as a 
proxy for market expectations has also received little attention 
because of limited access to the individual analyst forecasts 
comprising the consensus measures. In the one study addressing this 
issue, O’Brien [1985] finds the earnings forecasts of the most current 
individual analyst are ”at least as accurate” as the IBES consensus 
forecasts. O’Brien [1985], however, examines only one control for 
outdated forecasts and considers only the forecast errors of 
alternative consensus measures. Presently, the manner in which the 
information content of consensus revisions is affected by alternative 
methods of controlling for outdated forecasts has not been examined. 
This study directly tests the effect of alternative controls for both 
outlying and outdated forecasts on the information content of 
consensus revisions. 
2.3 Use of Individual Analyst Earnings Forecasts 
As an alternative to a consensus measure, other studies examine 
the earnings forecasts of individual analysts. Studies that have 
evaluated the forecasts of more than one analyst for a common sample 
of firms have largely concentrated on analyst forecast errors. 
Richards [1976] and Richards and Fraser [1977] compare the forecast 
accuracy of five analysts and nine analysts, respectively. Both 
studies report that the measured differences in forecast errors are 
not significant among analysts. In a more recent paper, Givoly [1985] 
examines the forecasts of 68 analysts and reports similarities in how 
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analysts following the same company incorporate past forecast errors 
in their new predictions. These studies, therefore, find little 
difference among analysts. 
While the relative accuracy of individual analysts has been 
examined in the literature, the relative information content of 
analyst forecast revisions has not been evaluated. Studies examining 
individual analyst revisions have relied solely on one analyst source 
for a given firm. It is unclear, however, how to distinguish one 
analyst from the remaining analysts. Various selection criteria have 
been employed in the literature. Gonedes, Dupoch and Penman [1976] 
select for examination in their study the individual analyst who first 
makes a forecast within the analysis period. Givoly and Lakonishok 
[1979] choose the "most active” analyst for each firm as determined by 
the number of forecasts made in the previous year. Finally, 
Abdel-khalik and Ajinkya [1982] and Brown, Griffin, Hagerman and 
Zmijewski [1984a] examine the forecasts of Merrill Lynch and Value 
Line respectively, thereby choosing one reputable source of analyst 
forecasts for all sample firms. Presently, it is not known whether 
the analyst identified using one selection criterion is different from 
that identified using an alternative criterion. Furthermore, there is 
no evidence on how the choice of a selection criterion may affect 
research inferences. 
2.4 Comparison of Analyst Sources 
By selecting different sources of analyst forecasts, previous 
empirical studies use alternative proxies for market expectations that 
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may influence the research findings. In choosing among alternative 
sources, the analyst forecast source that most closely approximates 
market expectations should be selected. This analyst source should 
provide the most timely forecast revisions to market participants. 
With this ideal in mind, the first objective of this study is to 
extend the work of Fried and Givoly [1982] and Brown, Griffin, 
Hagerman and Zmijewski [1984a] and examine the relative information 
content of forecast revisions made by consensus and individual analyst 
sources that have been referenced in the literature and suggested by 
those in the investment community. Eight alternative consensus 
measures and three individual analyst measures are examined. 
To compare these alternative analyst sources, the association 
between risk-adjusted security returns and analyst forecast revisions 
is measured in an effort to identify significant differences in the 
information content of alternative analyst forecast sources. This 
study, therefore, will provide evidence that is useful in future 
research design decisions on the selection of an analyst source of 
earnings forecasts. The analyst sources to be examined and the tests 
to be conducted in this analysis are discussed in Chapter III. 
In addition to the choice of analyst source, previous studies 
have indicated that the association between earnings numbers and 
security prices may be sensitive to other research design issues. 
Givoly and Lakonishok [1979] and Imhoff and Lobo [1982] find the 
association between earnings forecast revisions and abnormal returns 
is altered when measured using "good news" and "bad news" subsamples. 
Imhoff and Lobo [1984] also report sensitivity of results to use of 
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subsamples that exclude potentially confounding events. Other studies 
suggest association between earnings variables and security prices may 
be sensitive to the choice of the earnings variable deflator (Imhoff 
and Lobo [1984] and Elgers, Callahan and Strock [1986]), the security 
return measure (Cook and Rozeff [1984] and Imhoff and Lobo [1984]), 
the holding period (Givoly and Lakonishok [1979]) and the measure of 
association (Fried and Givoly [1982]). 
These alternative designs make the direct comparisons of previous 
results difficult and leave several unanswered questions about the 
appropriate design for future research. In an effort to address these 
questions, this study examines the relationship between forecast 
revisions and security prices using four alternative subsamples, two 
alternative deflators of earnings forecast revisions, five alternative 
abnormal return measures, seven alternative holding periods and two 
alternative measures of association. These various research designs 
are discussed in detail in Chapter III. 
2.5 Information Content of Multiple Sources of Information 
Studies that have used the forecasts of one analyst have largely 
relied on a priori selection criteria based on analyst characteristics 
that are believed to distinguish a market-leading analyst from the 
remaining analysts. By using a priori selection criteria, these 
studies have only examined a subset of the total number of analysts 
providing forecasts for highly followed firms. In addition, use of 
these selection criteria may be complicated by multiple analyst 
sources meeting the specified criteria. The second objective of this 
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study, therefore, is to provide a systematic method of testing for the 
existence and identification of a market-leading analyst without 
employing ad hoc selection criteria. The contemporaneous and lagged 
relationships between risk-adjusted security returns and the revisions 
provided by each of the analysts following a firm are measured. By 
examining all available analyst forecasts, this study more 
comprehensively tests for a market-leading analyst. 
Once a market-leading analyst (or analysts) has been identified, 
the marginal information content of revisions made by one individual 
analyst over and above the revisions of a market-leading analyst can 
be measured. Such analysis should lend insight into how market 
participants use multiple analyst forecasts of annual earnings. While 
the revision of one analyst may lead security prices, market 
participants may wait for confirmation of this market leader’s 
revision before fully adjusting stock prices. This notion is 
supported by recent findings of a corroboration or interaction effect 
between alternative sources of financial information. Kane, Lee and 
Marcus [1984] demonstrate that the security return corresponding to an 
unanticipated dividend increase or decrease is more pronounced when 
earnings are also above or below expectations. Jennings [1985] 
examines security returns around forecast announcements and finds an 
interaction effect between the size of one financial analyst forecast 
revision and the size of the unexpected component of a management 
earnings forecast. Imhoff and Lobo [1985] find an interaction between 
sales and earnings forecast revisions provided by Value Line when the 
abnormal returns around the time of the forecast revisions are 
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examined. In the second part of this study, the alternative sources 
of financial information to be examined are the market-leading 
analyst’s forecast revision and the subsequent revisions made by other 
selected analysts. By examining alternative analyst forecast sources, 
the results of this study provide further empirical evidence on how 
investors use multiple sources of financial information. 
2.6 Examination of Analyst Characteristics 
The existence of a market-leading analyst suggests that the 
characteristics of an analyst source may explain differential price 
reaction to alternative analyst forecast revisions. Givoly and 
Lakonishok [1979] suggest that the revisions of a market-leading 
analyst receive greater market response because the direction and 
magnitude of this analyst’s revisions differ from the previous 
revisions made by other analysts. Because this analyst's revision is 
distinctive, it reflects new information that market participants use 
to reassess security value. Security price reaction to revisions may, 
therefore, be determined by the uniqueness of an analyst’s forecast 
revision. 
Other analyst characteristics that may explain differential price 
reaction to forecast revisions are suggested by the empirical findings 
and individual analyst selection criteria of previous studies. 
Abdel-khalik and Ajinkya [1982] find significant price reaction to the 
earnings forecast revisions provided by Merrill Lynch. This evidence 
suggests that investors use information contained in the forecast 
revisions of Merrill Lynch analysts and that brokerage firm reputation 
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may be a factor that influences market reaction to an analyst revision 
source. 
The timing of analyst forecast revisions is a final 
characteristic that has been suggested in the literature. Selection 
of the analyst providing the first forecast for a given year by 
Gonedes, Dupoch and Penman [1976], suggests that the timing of an 
analyst’s forecast may affect the degree to which an analyst is 
followed. Richards and Martin [1979] indicate that the association 
between security returns and forecast revisions may also be dependent 
on the fiscal quarter in which the revision is made. Using consensus 
forecast revisions, Richards and Martin [1979] report that the market 
reaction to revisions in the first quarter is more pronounced than 
reaction to the revisions of any other quarter. They propose that 
this pattern may exist because investors are less able to anticipate 
information leading to revisions early in the year due to limited 
information availability.^ After actual earnings for the previous 
year are announced in the first quarter, investors may better 
anticipate analyst revisions. 
Alternatively, Imhoff and Lobo [1985] report that quarterly 
earnings and sales forecast revisions provided by Value Line are 
significantly related to abnormal returns in the second quarter, but 
are not significantly related in other quarters. It is suggested that 
market response may be more pronounced in the second quarter because 
management forecasts are more often made around this time. As a 
result, analyst revisions can be more readily verified and are, 
therefore, more informative. Given these alternative findings using 
21 
different data sources, the relationship between investor response to 
forecast revisions and the timing of the revisions is uncertain. 
While each of these studies suggests an alternative analyst 
characteristic that may explain differential market reaction to 
analyst revisions, no formal tests have been conducted to measure the 
explanatory power of each characteristic. The third and final 
objective of this proposed research, therefore, is to directly test 
the relationship between analyst characteristics and the market 
response to forecast revisions. In line with previous research, three 
characteristics are examined: (a) the uniqueness of the analyst 
revision, (b) the reputation of the analyst source providing the 
revision and (c) the timing of the forecast revision. The measures 
used to operationalize each of these characteristics are described in 
the following chapter. These tests will provide evidence on whether 
differential reaction to alternative analyst revisions can be 
systematically explained by differential characteristics. In 
addition, the relative effect of these alternative characteristics on 
security returns is evaluated. 
In summary, this study extends the previous research on analyst 
earnings forecasts in three ways. First, the information content of 
forecast revisions associated with consensus and individual analyst 
sources is compared, thereby evaluating which source most closely 
approximates market expectations. Secondly, the analyst whose 
revisions lead the market is more formally identified and the marginal 
information content of other analysts' revisions over and above the 
revision of a market-leading analyst is measured. Thirdly, the 
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relationship between analyst characteristics and the security price 
response to an analyst's revision is examined. 
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Chapter 2 Endnotes 
1There are several differences between these alternative sources 
of analyst forecasts. IBES includes the forecasts of larger brokerage 
houses, while Standard and Poor includes more regional brokerage firms 
than IBES. In addition, IBES compiles and publishes consensus 
measures once a month, while Zacks produces a weekly consensus 
measure. 
2 
Brown, Foster and Noreen [1985] also examine a third proxy for 
consensus forecasts, the number of individual analyst forecasts 
revised up in month "m" less the number of individual analyst 
forecasts revised down in month "m". Statisical inferences were also 
found to be insensitive to this consensus definition. 
3 
R. S. Harris, "Using Analysts* Growth Forecasts to Estimate 
Shareholder Required Rates of Return," Financial Management (Spring 
1986), p. 60. 
4 
R. M. Richards and J. D. Martin, "Revisions in Earnings 
Forecasts: How Much Response?" Journal of Portfolio Management 
(Summer 1979), p. 51. 
CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Samples Selection and Alternative Subsamples 
The research sample consists of analyst forecasts of annual 
earnings per share for all firms meeting necessary data requirements. 
The forecasts and revision dates are obtained from the 1980 and 1981 
detailed monthly reports of the Institutional Brokers Estimate System 
(IBES) compiled by Lynch, Jones and Ryan. Unlike the more commonly 
used IBES monthly summary reports, the IBES detailed reports provide 
the earnings forecasts and subsequent forecast revisions made by 
individual security analysts. Each of the firms used in this study 
satisfy the following criteria: (1) For the period January 1978 to 
March 1982, daily return data are available for its common stock on 
the 1983 CRSP tapes, (2) Data on closing price for the years ending 
1979 and 1980 are available on the 1982 Compustat Industrial data 
base, (3) The firm's fiscal year ends on December 31, and 
(4) Earnings forecasts of at least three analysts are available for 
the firm in any given month. 
The first two criteria are necessary to ensure that complete data 
is available for market model parameter estimation and abnormal 
security return calculations. The third criterion permits 
cross-sectional comparisons by assuring that forecast horizons during 
any given period are the same for all firms. Finally, the last data 
screen is used to identify firms with consensus measures that are 
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reflective of more than one analyst. With this available data, the 
test period for this analysis is January 1980 through December 1981. 
The number of firms meeting these data requirements are 239 for 
1980 and 173 for 1981, as described in Table 1. This sample size far 
exceeds the sample size of 49 and 70 used by Givoly and Lakonishok 
[1979] and Imhoff and Lobo [1982], respectively. Table 1 also 
indicates the number of individual analyst revisions available for 
each year. These revisions are provided by approximately 600 
individual analysts from over 50 brokerage firms. As indicated by the 
mean number of analysts following a given firm (15 in 1980 and 17 in 
1981), the data requirements result in the inclusion of largely 
well-established and highly followed firms. 
As noted in the introductory chapter, analyst forecasts are only 
one source of information used by market participants. One potential 
problem in assessing the information content of financial analyst 
forecasts is the confounding effect of information released from other 
sources during the analysis period. To control for this problem, this 
analysis is conducted on the full sample of all firm-weeks that 
include an analyst forecast revision and on a subsample. The 
subsample excludes those firm-weeks that contain confounding events 
relating to (1) announcements of quarterly earnings and/or 
(2) disclosure of earnings forecasts by management. While there are 
unlimited sources of financial information, previous empirical studies 
(Brown and Kennelly [1972] and Patell [1976]) report significant 
abnormal security returns are realized around the dates of these two 
events. In addition, these two events have been used in previous 
Table 1 
DESCRIPTION OF SAMPLE 
1980 1981 
Firms meeting data screens 
described in Section 2.1 238 173 
Total number of individual 
analyst revisions 7,002 7,124 
Number of upward revisions 3,294 2,085 
Number of downward revisions 3,708 5,039 
Mean number of analysts 
following a firm 15.05 17.07 
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studies to control for confounding events (Givoly and Lakonishok 
[1979] and Imhoff and Lobo [1984]). To determine the weeks in the 
test period during which these confounding events occur, the Wall 
Street Journal Index is used. This source has been shown to 
consistently identify earnings announcements by Wright and Groff 
[1986]. 
In addition to examining subsamples that exclude potential 
confounding events, this study also examines subsamples formed on the 
basis of the sign of the revision. Studies by Imhoff and Lobo [1985] 
and Givoly and Lakonishok [1979] find abnormal returns are more 
pronounced around upward forecast revisions than for downward 
revisions. This finding may exist because of timing differences of 
"good news" and "bad news”. Grossman [1980] notes that analysts are 
reluctant to advise selling stock or to lower earnings forecasts and 
Penman [1984] reports that earnings reports are published early when 
containing good news and are delayed when representing bad news. As a 
result, investors may better anticipate bad news prior to a downward 
forecast revision causing market response to be less concentrated 
around the time of a downward revision than of an upward revision. 
Consequently, this study examines a "good news" subsample and a "bad 
news" subsample in addition to the full sample of upward and downward 
revisions 
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3*2 Alternative Analyst Forecast Sources Examined 
To examine the relative information content of alternative 
analyst revision sources, eight consensus measures and three 
individual analyst sources are used. The consensus sources are 
described in Section 3*2.1 followed by a discussion of the individual 
analyst sources in Section 3*2.2. 
3.2.1 Alternative Consensus Sources 
The following eight consensus sources (Cl to C8) are examined in 
this study: 
Cl. Mean of All C5* Median of All 
C2. 1-Month Mean C6. 1-Month Median 
C3* 2-Month Mean C7* 2-Month Median 
C4. 3-Month Mean C8. 3-Month Median 
The "Mean of All" and ’’Median of All" are published each month by IBES 
in their monthly report. These two measures are summary statistics of 
all outstanding earnings forecasts made by analysts included in IBES, 
regardless of the timing of the forecast. Many empirical studies, 
such as Elton, Gruber and Gultekin [1981] and Imhoff and Lobo [1984], 
use the IBES data source and the "Mean of All" has been almost 
exclusively employed as the consensus measure. By comparing the "Mean 
of All" and the "Median of All" in this study, the manner in which 
investors incorporate extreme or outlying earnings forecasts can be 
examined. 
The other six consensus measures employed in this study 
(C2,C3,C4,C6,C7,C8) attempt to control for outdated forecasts. These 
measures include only those earnings forecasts made within a given 
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time period. Because it is unclear what is the appropriate "inclusion 
period" (the time period beyond which investors deem forecasts 
outdated), three alternative periods are examined: 1 month, 2 months 
and 3 months. These inclusion periods and the associated consensus 
measures are diagrammed in Table 2. The "1-Month Mean" for example, 
is measured as the equal-weighted forecast of only those forecasts 
made within the four weeks prior to the publication of the IBES 
monthly report. This consensus measure, therefore, includes only 
those forecasts that have been revised after the previous monthly 
report. The "1-Month Median" is measured as the median of these 
forecasts. 
| | I I I I I I I I I I I Weeks relative to 











Alternative Inclusion Periods and 
Six Alternative Consensus Measures 
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3*2.2 Alternative Individual Analyst Sources 
At the individual analyst level, three selection criteria are 
used to distinguish the forecasts of one analyst from the entire 
sample of analysts providing earnings forecasts to IBES. These three 




The '’First” analyst source is selected as the analyst who makes the 
first forecast for a sample firm in the year of interest. The 
"Largest" analyst source is identified as that analyst belonging to 
the largest brokerage firm following a sample firm. The 
"All-American" analyst source is the top-ranked analyst on the 
"All-American Research Team" published in Institutional Investor in 
the year prior to the analysis year. This "Team" consists of the 
three top-ranked analysts for over 40 industries, therefore, the 
"All-American" analyst source is the most highly ranked analyst in the 
sample firm's industry.1 
The first selection criterion is similar to that of Gonedes, 
Dupoch and Penman [1976]. The second individual analyst choice uses 
brokerage size as a proxy for reputation, the analyst characteristic 
suggested by Abdel-khalik and Ajinkya [1982]. The third selection 
criterion has not been tested in previous studies but has intuitive 
appeal for use in identifying the analyst most closely followed for a 
given firm. Institutional Investor obtains rankings of security 
analysts from questionnaires distributed to over 600 money management 
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organizations. As a result, users of analyst forecasts may 
distinguish among analysts based on their own experiences and on the 
various analyst characteristics they consider important for making 
investment decisions. 
3.3 Forecast Revision Measures Using Alternative Deflators 
To examine the information content of alternative sources of 
analyst forecast revisions, the association between a firm’s 
risk-adjusted security returns and the forecast revisions of each 
source are examined. The revision measure used in this analysis 
should reflect the change in the sources' earnings forecasts from one 
forecast to the next. This change in a financial analyst's forecast 
(AFAF) can be expressed as follows: 
AFAFm FAF ikt - FAF ikl (1) 
where: FAF - the earnings forecast for firm "i" made in 
week "t" by analyst source "k" (k = Cl to 
C8, II, 12, and 13) 
FAF = the latest earnings forecast for firm "i", 
made by source "k" prior to week "t" 
Two deflators are used to scale AFAF and to permit comparisons 
of revision measures across firms and across time. These alternative 
deflators are used because it has been shown by Imhoff and Lobo [1984] 
and Elgers, Callahan and Strock [1986] that the association between an 
earnings variable and security returns may be sensitive to the choice 
of deflator. The first deflator is the absolute value of the previous 
forecast made by the analyst source of interest. This conventional 
deflator has been used extensively in previous research and provides a 
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measure of the percentage forecast change. To control for the small 
denominator problem associated with this deflator, a 100$ truncation 
rule is applied, as suggested by Brown, Griffin, Hagerman and 
Zmijewski [1984b]. 
The second deflator is the standard deviation of the distribution 
of financial analyst forecasts of interest. This deflator serves as a 
measure of the relative dispersion about the consensus prediction. 
Imhoff and Lobo [1984] find revision variables scaled by this 
variability deflator are more highly associated with security returns 
than when a more conventional revision variable, deflated by the 
absolute value of the mean forecast, is used. 
With these alternative deflators, the following revision 
variables (REV) are used in this analysis for each analyst source: 
REV(1)ikt » AFAFikt/|FAFml (2) 
REV(2)ikt - AFAFikt/SDi(m-i (3) 
where: - the absolute value of the latest earnings 
forecast for firm "i" made by the analyst 
source "k" prior to week "t" (k = Cl to C8, 
II, 12, 13) 
SD. ^ = the standard deviation of the distribution 
of financial analyst forecasts of interest 
made for firm ”i" in the previous month2 
As a result of these calculations, a total of 22 revision variables 
[(8 consensus sources + 3 individual analyst sources) x (2 deflators)] 
are examined in the first part of this study. 
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3.4 Abnormal Return Measures Using Alternative Holding Periods 
Stock price adjustments to earnings forecast revisions are 
measured in this study using risk-adjusted returns. Weekly "abnormal’1 
returns (AR) are measured using the market model and an equal-weighted 
market model index as follows: 
ARit = + Rit> - [«i +/§iln(1 + Rmt)] W 
where: = the actual return in week "t" for the 
common stock of firm "i", aggregated from 
the CRSP daily tapes 
Rmt = the actual return in week "t" of the CRSP 
equal-weighted market index 
A 
Ofi = the market model parameters estimated for 
firm "i" using OLS and the 104 weekly 
returns preceding the year of analysis 
This abnormal return is measured for the week that includes the 
revision date associated with each of the eight consensus and three 
individual analyst sources. As used by Imhoff and Lobo [1984], the 
revision date for the consensus sources is the publication date of the 
IBES monthly report; the date when the monthly consensus measures are 
made public to subscribers. For the individual analyst sources, this 
revision date is the reported calendar date associated with a 
particular analyst’s revision. As noted by Brown, Foster and Noreen 
[1985], there may exist a reporting lag between the time the forecast 
revision is made available to clients and the time the revision is 
reported to IBES. As a result, weekly revision announcement dates and 
weekly security returns are used instead of daily data to improve the 
power of the proposed statistical tests, as suggested by Dyckman, 
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Philbrick and Stephan [1984]. The revision week [t = 0] is measured 
as the week that includes the revision date. 
Because of the uncertainty associated with the exact timing of 
analyst forecast disclosure, risk-adjusted security returns are also 
measured over alternative holding periods that include the revision 
week [t = 0]. Various holding periods have been used in previous 
studies and there is little agreement on the appropriate length and 
timing of the holding period. To examine consensus revisions, Imhoff 
and Lobo [1984] use one-month holding periods that correspond to the 
calendar month in which the consensus revision was published. To 
evaluate individual analyst revisions, Abdel-khalik and Ajinkya [1982] 
use weekly holding periods around the revision week and Givoly and 
Lakonishok [1979] use monthly holding periods surrounding the revision 
month. 
Ideally, the holding period should span the period when 
information relating to a forecast revision is made available to 
investors. This time period is most likely different for consensus 
revisions than for individual analyst forecast revisions. At the 
consensus level, information relating to the individual forecast 
revisions that are included in the consensus revision are disclosed 
throughout the one-month period between monthly report publications. 
An appropriate holding period return for examining alternative 
consensus sources, therefore, may be the four-week cumulated abnormal 
return (CAR) that includes the returns associated with the consensus 
revision week [t = 0] and the three weeks prior to this week 
[t = -3, -2, -1]. Because IBES monthly reports are typically 
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published in the third week of the month, this four-week holding 
period, [t = -3, -2, -1, 0], would not be equivalent to the calendar 
one-month holding period, [t = -2, -1, 0, +1], used by Imhoff and Lobo 
[1984]. This study compares the associations between consensus 
revisions and risk-adjusted returns obtained using each of these 
four-week holding periods. 
At the individual analyst level, information relating to one 
analysts revisions may be made available in a shorter time period 
than four weeks. If a four-week CAR includes returns outside the 
"true” revision period, the power of the statistical tests is 
decreased. As a result, holding period returns that may be more 
appropriate for individual analyst forecasts are examined. In 
addition, holding periods including weeks preceding t = -3 are also 
used, as Givoly and Lakonishok [1979] find significant abnormal 
returns begin to form two months prior to an individual analyst 
revision announcements. 
Given the different nature of consensus and individual analyst 
forecast revisions, seven alternative holding periods are examined, as 
delineated in Table 3. Analysis at the consensus level and individual 
analyst level use all seven holding periods.3 Weeks surrounding the 
revision week are denoted in Table 3 according to their position 
relative to week 0. 
For each holding period, [tl, t2], a CAR measure using the 
equal-weighted market index (ECAR) is computed as follows: 
t2 




By examining seven holding periods in this study, the pattern by which 
investors change their expectations can be examined, as well as the 
sensitivity of the association between risk-adjusted security returns 
and revision variables to varying cumulation periods. 
Weeks Included: Notation Form: 
0 [ 0 ] 
-1,0 [-1, 0] 
-2,-1,0 [-2, 0] 
-3,-2,-1,0 [-3, 0] 
-7,-6,-5,-4,-3,-2,-1,0 [-7, 0] 
0, + 1 [ 0,+1] 
-2,-1,0,+1 [-2,+1] 
Table 3 
Alternative Holding Periods Examined 
3.5 Alternative CAR Measures 
The abnormal return measure, ECAR, described in Section 3»^ is 
one of the more commonly used abnormal return metrics employed in 
event studies. Four alternative CAR measures are also examined in 
this study to evaluate the sensitivity of results to abnormal return 
definitions. 
The equal-weighted index is selected in Equation (5) because 
Elgers and Murray [1982] find this index provides market model 
parameter estimates that are more stable than those provided by a 
value-weighted index. In addition, Brown and Warner [1980] find the 
equal-weighted index is more likely to pick up abnormal security 
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performance than the value-weighted index. Imhoff and Lobo [1984], 
however, employ a value-weighted index to obtain abnormal return 
measures and to test the information content of consensus revisions. 
In order to more directly compare the results of this study to Imhoff 
and Lobo, CAHs measured using the CRSP value-weighted index (VCAR) are 
used as a second CAR measure. 
The third CAR measure is a standardized CAR (SCAR) that has been 
used by Cook and Rozeff [1984] and Imhoff and Lobo [1985]. SCAR for 
holding period [t1, t2] is measured as follows: 
t2 
SCARi = (ARit/sit ^ (6) 
where: AR is as defined in Equation (1) 
= the standard deviation of realized security 
returns (In(1 + Rit)) around^ the measured 
expected returns ( o< + /3 ln(1 + Rmt)) 
over the market model estimation period 
As discussed by Cook and Rozeff [1984], the economic significance of 
ECAR may be dependent on the volatility of a firm’s security returns. 
By standardizing the weekly abnormal returns, therefore, SCAR is used 
in this study to control for firm specific volatility that may affect 
statistical inferences.^ 
If the market model used in Equation (1) is correctly specified, 
the average ECAR for a given holding period should not be 
significantly different from zero for a random sample. For a 
nonrandom sample, however, there may be nonzero average 
cross-sectional returns during some weeks. Nonzero returns may be the 
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result of an event that affects the selected sample firms but that is 
unrelated to earnings forecast revisions. To avoid attributing these 
nonzero abnormal returns to earning forecast revisions, a fourth CAR 
measure (MCAR) uses mean-corrected abnormal returns, computed as 
follows for holding period [t1, t2]s 
t2 n 
(7) 
where: AR^ is as described in Equation (1) 
n = the number of sample firms experiencing 
earnings forecast revisions during the test 
period 
Tests that use abnormal returns as measured in Equation (5) may¬ 
be sensitive to cross-sectional dependence between contemporaneous 
risk-adjusted security returns. Cross-sectional dependence leads to 
biased estimates of the variance of the risk-adjusted returns, and 
therefore biased t-tests and F-tests. One source of cross-sectional 
dependence may be the omission of common factors from the market model 
used to estimate risk-adjusted returns [Equation (4)]. Three factors 
that have received attention in the literature are size, 
earnings-yield and share price (Reinganum [1981], Basu [1978], and 
Kross [1985]). Recently, Elgers, Callahan and Strock [1986] find that 
the share price anomaly is more significant and consistent than the 
size effect and that it subsumes the earnings yield effect for the 
period 1978-1981. In addition, Elgers, Schneeweis and Strock [1984] 
show that a CAR measure may be sensitive to measurement error in the 
estimate of the market model parameters ( °< and /3 ) for this same time 
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period. 
To control for these factors, the risk adjusted returns estimated 
using Equation (5) are further adjusted for price and estimation 
error. To obtain adjusted CAR measures, the following cross-sectional 





q+ b-j (PRICE)^+ Ebj+1PQij+ bg(c?0^+ by( yG)^+ (8) 
where: ECAR^ = the cumulated abnormal measure using 
equal-weighted index for firm "i" for 
holding period [t1, t2] 
PRICE.^ = the natural log of price for firm "i", 
measured at the beginning of the analysis 
year 
= state variable based 
PQii = 1 if firm "i" 
quintile, otherwise, PQ 
on PRICE quintile; 
is in the jth PRICE 
0 
O'i = the OLS estimate of alpha as described in 
Equation (5) 
A 
= the OLS estimate of beta as described in 
Equation (5) 
The state variables, PQjj, j=1,...4, are included in this model 
because Elgers, Callahan and Strock [1986] report that, on an 
individual year basis, the continuous price variable and state 
variables for price quintile membership are significant in a 
cross-sectional model of abnormal returns. The last two variables in 
Equation (8) are included as controls for estimation error that is 
linearly related to the estimated market model parameters, as 
suggested by Hong [1977] and Elgers, Schneeweis and Strock [1984]. 
Bayesian parameter adjustments, such as those provided by Maier, 
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Peterson and Vander Weide [1982], are often used to reduce the 
measurement error in market model parameter estimates. In this 
analysis, OLS market model parameter estimates are included in 
Equation (8) as an alternative method to control for parameter 
estimation error for two reasons. First, Elgers, Schneeweis and 
Strock [1984] find that the relationship between earnings variables 
and abnormal returns is minimally affected by the use of 
Bayesian-adjusted parameter estimates in place of unadjusted market 
model parameter estimates. Secondly, Elgers, Schneeweis and Strock 
[1984] demonstrate that the Bayesian-adjusted estimates of or and ft 
are significantly associated with cumulated abnormal returns computed 
with these parameter estimates. The Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM), however, implies that there is no relationship to be expected 
between these parameters and the CARs. If parameter estimation error 
is linearly associated with the market model parameter estimates 
(e. g. high p> estimates are overestimated and low /3 estimates are 
underestimated), this significant association suggests that 
Bayesian-adjustraents only partially remove parameter estimation error. 
Inclusion of the OLS parameters in Equation (8) may, therefore, 
provide a more extensive control for measurement error. 
The adjusted CAR (ACAR) is used as a fifth CAR measure and is 
measured for holding period [t1, t2] as follows: 
ACARi = ei (9) 
where: e^ = the estimated error term of Equation (8) 
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The holding period for ACAR corresponds to the holding period of ECAR 
used to estimate Equation (8). For example, ACAR for holding period 
[-1,0] is the estimated error term of Equation (8) using ECAR [-1,0] 
as the dependent variable. In this manner, ACAR represents the 
portion of the risk-adjusted security return that cannot be explained 
by the share price anomaly or by estimation error as proxied by the 
market model parameter estimates. ACAR may, therefore, provide 
risk-adjusted returns that are less affected by serial correlation or 
measurement error. 
In summary, five alternative CAR definitions (ECAR, VCAR, SCAR, 
MCAR and ACAR) are used in this study to measure abnormal security 
returns around an earnings forecast revision. Four alternative CAR 
measures are used in addition to ECAR in an effort to determine how 
sensitive the empirical results of this study are to the CAR 
definition. 
3.6 Tests of Relative Information Content 
The first research question of this study relates to the relative 
information content of the eight consensus sources (Cl to C8 as 
described in Section 3.2.1) and three individual analyst sources (II, 
12 and 13, as described in Section 3.2.2). For each of these analyst 
sources, the information content is defined as the degree of 
association between the forecast revision variable (REV(1) or REV(2)) 
* 
and the correponding abnormal return measure (ECAR, VCAR, SCAR, MCAR 
or ACAR). With this definition, the first null hypothesis (Hypothesis 
1) can be stated in general terms as follows: 
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^q-|S The association between financial analyst forecast 
revisions (REV^.) and abnormal security returns (CAR) is 
equivalent across all "k” analyst sources, k = Cl to 
C8, II, 12 and 13. 
For all consensus and individual analyst sources, Spearman rank 
correlation coefficients are used as one measure of the 
revision-return association. Because earnings forecast errors have 
been shown to be nonnormally distributed (Brown, Griffin, Hagerman and 
Zmijewski [1984a]), this nonparametric correlation measure has been 
used in previous research related to earnings forecasts (e.g. Beaver, 
Clarke and Wright [1979] and Imhoff and Lobo [1984]). Consequently, 
the Spearman correlation results of this study are more directly 
comparable to those of previous studies.5 
Due to the different nature of consensus and individual analyst 
sources, as described below, the tests used to measure the information 
content differences among consensus sources are not the same as those 
used to measure the differences among individual analyst sources. As 
a result, the first null hypothesis can be separated into two 
sub-hypotheses (Hypothesis 1A and Hypothesis IB). Hypothesis 1A 
relates to the consensus sources and is stated first followed by a 
description of Hypothesis IB which relates to the individual analyst 
sources. 
At the consensus level, revisions are reported once a month in 
the IBES report. While the magnitude of a revision may vary across 
the eight consensus measures, all eight consensus sources share the 
same revision week, the publication week of the IBES report. As a 
result, the CAR measured over the seven holding periods around this 
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common revision week is the same for all eight consensus sources (Cl 
to C8). The marginal information content of the revisions of one 
consensus measures over another can, therefore, be determined by 
examining the association (as measured by the Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient and denoted "r") of this common CAR measure 
and the difference between the revisions of these two consensus 
measures. Hypothesis 1A can, therefore, be stated as follows: 
1A: monthly forecast revisions of an alternative 
consensus source (e.g. C2 to C8) contains no 
significant marginal information content over and 
above the monthly revisions of another consensus 
source (e.g. Cl). ( r(CAR, REV _ REVri) = 0 for all 
k = C2 to C8) K Ul 
Hypothesis 1A is rejected for a given consensus source if this 
correlation coefficient (r) is statistically significant. This null 
hypothesis is tested using 8 alternative consensus sources, 2 
alternative revision deflators, 7 alternative holding periods, 5 
alternative CAR measures and 4 alternative samples for a total of 
2,240 alternative combinations. 
Because the revisions of individual analysts are announced at 
different points in time, this type of analysis cannot be used to 
compare the three individual analyst sources (II, 12 and 13). As a 
result, Kendall correlation coefficients (denoted "d") are computed, 
in addition to Spearman rank coefficients, to measure the association 
between the analyst's revisions and the alternative CAR measures. The 
Kendall coefficient is used because of the availability of a test for 
differences in two sample correlation coefficients, as described by 
Thakkar [1978, pp. 216-217]. Hypothesis IB can, therefore, be stated 
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as follows: 
Hq1B: The association between financial analyst forecast 
revisions and abnormal security returns is equivalent 
across all three individual analyst sources. 
( d(REV,CAR)j = d(REV,CAR)k for all j,k = II, 12, 13) 
Hypothesis IB is rejected for a given individual analyst if the 
difference in Kendall correlation coefficients is significantly 
different from zero. This null hypothesis is tested using 3 
individual analyst sources, 2 alternative revision deflators, 7 
alternative holding periods, 5 alternative CAR measures and 4 
alternative samples for a total of 840 alternative combinations. 
In addition to correlation coefficients, weighted CARs are also 
used as a measure of revision-return association. While weighted CARs 
can be measured in various ways, the weighted CAR methodology 
described by Fried and Givoly [1982] is used in this study. For each 
consensus and individual analyst source, a portfolio including all 
sample securities is formed for each of the test periods. Each 
portfolio return is measured as a weighted sum of the individual 
security CARs. The weight for each firm’s CAR is determined by the 
size and sign of the forecast revision made for that firm by the 
analyst source. Specifically, the portfolio weight, (wikt), assigned 
to security ”i” for analyst source "k" in week "t” is measured as 
follows^: 
wikt = REVikt/£ %- |REViktl 
where: REV = the scaled revision made by analyst source 
lkt ”k" in week "t" for firm ”i” 
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The weighted portfolio CAR (WCAR) associated with analyst source "k" 
in a given year is then measured in the following manner: 
(11) 
By using weighted portfolio CARs, an investment strategy can be 
evaluated where long and short positions are taken in accordance with 
the direction and magnitude of the corresponding forecast revisions. 
Weighted CARs are measured using all seven holding periods. Lacking 
appropriate tests for differences in weighted CARs, descriptive 
statistics on the weighted CARs for each consensus and analyst source 
are reported. By using both correlation coefficients and weighted 
CARs to measure relative information content, the sensitivity of the 
results to this research design can be ascertained. 
3.7 Identifying the Market Leader and Measuring Marginal Information 
A market leader, as suggested by Givoly and Lakonishok [1979], is 
an analyst that produces forecast revisions that provide new 
information to the financial community which is used by investors and 
may be reproduced in the revisions of followers. If the market is 
semi-strong efficient, security prices will change in response to the 
new information contained in the market leader's revision at the time 
this revision is disclosed. Since this information is impounded in 
stock prices when it is first revealed in the market leader's 
revision, security prices should not be affected by the subsequent 
forecast revisions made by the followers if these revisions only 
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reproduce this information. As a result, the revisions of a market 
leader should be contemporaneously associated with security price 
changes and the revisions of followers should lag security price 
changes. By examining contemporaneous and lag relationships between 
forecast revisions and risk-adjusted returns, therefore, one may be 
able to distinguish a market leader or leaders from the remaining 
analysts. 
Most analysts concentrate their efforts on the firms belonging to 
one or two industries. Therefore, it seems more likely that an 
analyst source can be distinguished as a market leader for a 
particular industry, rather than for all available companies. With 
this industry specialization in mind, the contemporaneous and lagged 
relationships between analyst forecast revisions and security returns 
are examined at the industry level. All individual analyst sources 
provided by the IBES detailed reports are examined to more 
comprehensively identify a market-leading analyst source. For each 
industry group in a given year, the following regression models are 
estimated for each analyst source ”k”: 
ECAR 
i,m = a0 + a1(REVikm) + eaim 
i,ra-1 = ^0 + b1^REVikm^ + ebim 
(12) 
ECAR (13) 
where: ECAR. = the ECAR for firm "i" in revision month 
ECAR - i^CAR for firm "i" in revision month 
REV. = the scaled revision made for firm "i" in 
1 month "m" by analyst source "k" 
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m = 1, 2, ... 12 months in the analysis year 
i = 1, 2, ... n companies included in a 
particular industry group 
Pooled time-series and cross-section data are used to estimate 
Equation (12) and Equation (13)• Twelve monthly forecast revisions 
are obtained for each industry firm that an analyst is following. 
Assuming the absence of a forecast revision by analyst source ”k” is a 
confirmation of his outstanding forecast, this research design ensures 
an equal number of observations (twelve) for each firm. For analyst 
source ”k”, the twelve monthly forecast revisions made for each firm 
in a given industry group are merged. Equations (12) and (13) are, 
therefore, estimated using (n x 12) observations, where ”n” is the 
number of industry firms followed by analyst "k”J 
Equations (12) and (13) are used to examine the relationships 
between the forecast revisions of an analyst source and risk-adjusted 
security returns within a particular industry. Six industry groups 
are examined in this analysis as identified by the two-digit SIC code 
listed on the 1983 CRSP daily tapes. Each industry contains a minimum 
of six firms and is followed by a minimum of 25 analysts, as described 
in Table 4. 
For a given sample industry, the size and significance of the 
model coefficients (a and b^ for each of the individual analyst 
sources are compared to determine which analyst’s forecast revisions 
are contemporaneously associated with risk-adjusted returns and which 
lag the market. The analyst source with the highest association 
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Table 4 
INDUSTRY GROUPS USED TO EXAMINE MARGINAL INFORMATION CONTENT 
Total Number of Firms and Analysts 




SIC Industry Group //firms //analysts //firms //analysts 
26 Paper/Paper Products 9 25 6 30 
28 Chemicals 33 36 32 40 
29 Petroleum Refining 16 31 10 29 
35 Machinery 18 38 12 39 
36 Electrical Equipment 11 33 9 34 
37 Transportation 9 29 7 33 
//analysts = Number of analysts providing forecasts for at least one 
firm included in the industry group 
49 
between risk-adjusted security returns and analyst forecast revisions 
as demonstrated in Equation (12) is identified as a market leader (ML) 
for a given industry. These regression models are also used to 
identify the three remaining analysts (e.g. A1, A2, A3) whose 
revisions are significantly and contemporaneously associated with 
risk-adjusted security returns in a given industry for this period of 
study. An F-test using a multiple regression model are used for each 
industry group to determine if the revisions of these selected 
analysts (A1, A2, A3) contribute anything to explaining the cumulative 
abnormal returns over and above the market leader's forecast 
revisions. 
The appropriate F-test to examine marginal explanatory power 
requires the calculations of an incremental F-statistic, as described 
by Kmenta [1971, pp. 370-371]* The incremental F-statistic, for a 






where: ECAR. l.m = the ECAR for firm "i" in revision month 
"m" 
REV. = the scaled revision made for firm "i" 
i,ML,ra month "m" by the market leader (ML) 
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^EVi km = the 3Galed revision made for firm "iM 
in month "m" by analyst source "k", 
k = A1, A2, A3 
If the incremental F-statistic for a particular industry is 
significant, this suggests that the forecasts of analysts other than a 
market leader have marginal information content. Such a finding would 
indicate that the forecast revisions of an analyst are more than just 
reproductions of a market leader's revisions and/or that investors 
wait for confirmation of a market leader's revision before fully 
adjusting stock prices. 
With these two models delineated, the second null hypothesis 
(Hypothesis 2) can be stated as follows: 
Hq2: The forecast revisions made by the analysts most 
closely following the market leader (A1, A2, A3) 
contain no marginal information over and above the 
information contained in the revisions of a 
market-leading analyst (ML). (The incremental 
F-statistic computed for each industry group using 
Equations (14) and (15) is not significantly different 
from zero.) 
To test this hypothesis, Equations (14) and (15) are estimated 
using ordinary least squares. A single multiple regression model has 
been previously used to examine incremental information content by 
Brown, Griffin, Hagerman and Zmijewski [1984b] and Jennings [1985]. 
This design is supported over other tests for incremental information 
content by Christie, Kennelley, King and Schaeffer [1980]. The 
incremental F-test are used in this analysis rather than t-tests on 
individual coefficients because of potential multicollinearity 
problems. 
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3.8 Measurement of Analyst Characteristics 
Three analyst characteristics are examined in the third section 
of this study in an effort to explain differential stock price 
reaction to analyst forecast revisions. The first characteristic, the 
uniqueness of an analyst forecast revision (UNIQ), considers the 
magnitude and direction of a specific analyst’s revision relative to 
the previous earnings forecast revision made by another analyst for 
the sample firm. In this manner the time series of all available 
analyst forecasts can be considered, rather than isolating the 
forecasts of only one analyst source. To illustrate this point, the 
financial analyst forecasts (FAF) of two analysts are provided in 
Table 5. 












FAF = $5.20 
Table 5 
Time Series of Alternative Analyst Earnings Forecasts 
In previous forecast revision studies, unexpected earnings have 
been measured using the difference between one analyst’s revised 
forecast and the previous forecast of that same analyst. Using the 
forecasts made by analyst A in Table 5, for example, the unexpected 
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earnings measured at week 8 is 30$ [($5.20 - $4.00)/($4.00)]. With 
more than one analyst following a firm, however, the earnings 
forecasts made between week 1 and week 8 by other analysts (such as 
the $5.00 forecast made by analyst B) may be incorporated in market 
expectations at week 8. The unanticipated or unique component of 
analyst A's forecast at week 8 would, therefore, be 5$ 
[($5.20 - $5.00)/($5.00)]. As a result, the market response to 
analyst A's second forecast may be less pronounced given analyst B's 
forecast than if no other forecasts were made between week 1 and 
week 8. 
With access to the individual analyst forecasts collected by 
IBES, this "times series" approach is used to obtain a measure of 
uniqueness (UNIQ). UNIQ is measured as the quintile membership of the 
following continuous variable (UNIQ1): 
UNIQ1 = (FAFlqt . FAFipt)/|FAFipt| (16) 




for firm "i" made by 
FAF = earnings 
P analyst 
forecast for firm "i" made by 
"p"; the forecast made closest to 
but preceding FAFi 
It is expected that response to analyst revisions will be more 
positive (negative) for the largest (smallest) UNIQ quintile. 
The second characteristic of interest is the reputation of the 
analyst (REPUT). Because there is no direct way to measure an 
analyst’s reputation, a performance ranking is used as a proxy. The 
ranking of overall brokerage firm performance as provided by the 
Institutional Investor in the year prior to the analysis year is used 
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to measure REPUT. These performance measures are then ranked from 
smallest to largest and divided into quartiles. REPUT is, therefore, 
measured as the quartile membership, with REPUT=1 representing the top 
performance quartile and REPUT=4 representing the worst performance 
quartile. This ex ante measure attempts to more directly measure the 
perceived performance of each of the brokerage firms. 
The timing of an analyst forecast revision is the third 
characteristic to be examined. The timing of a revision (TIME) is 
measured as a state variable which can take on one of three values (2, 
3, 4). These values correspond to the fiscal quarters of the forecast 
revision. By using this measure, the "fiscal quarter effect" reported 
by Imhoff and Lobo [1985] can be directly examined. Because of a 
limited number of revisions made in January, February or March, the 
first quarter is not included in this analysis. 
With these three characteristic measures (UNIQ, REP, TIME), the 
third null hypothesis (Hypothesis 3) can be stated as follows: 
Hq-: Risk-adjusted security returns measured around revision 
announcement dates are not associated with measures of 
the uniqueness of the revision (UNIQ), the reputation 
of the analyst source (REP), nor with the timing of the 
revision (TIME). 
This hypothesis is tested using analysis of covariance (ANCOVA). 
The treatment variables for this analysis are the three 
characteristic variables, UNIQ, REP, and TIME. Four covariates are 
also included in the ANCOVA model: REV, BETA, ALPHA and PRICE. REV 
is the deflated forecast revisions as described in Equation (2). By 
controlling for differences in REV, this research design allows one to 
test whether for a given revision, differential market reaction to 
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analyst forecast revisions can be explained by analyst 
characteristics. BETA, ALPHA and PRICE are as described in Section 
3-5 and are used to control for differences in estimation error and 
security price that may bias the ANCOVA results. 
The response variable for this analysis is the abnormal security 
return measured around the revision week using alternative holding 
periods and alternative CAR measures described in Sections 3.4 and 
3.5. The association between each of these characteristic variables 
and abnormal security returns is evaluated by examining the 
significance level of each corresponding F-ratio. In addition, to 
determine how sensitive these results are to the direction of the 
forecast revision, separate ANCOVA’s are conducted on downward 
revisions and on upward revisions. 
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Chapter 3 Endnotes 
The industry classifications for most sample firms was easily 
identified as Institutional Investor lists many of the firms followed 
by the All-American analysts. Sample firms were omitted from the 
first part of this analysis if the industry classification was unclear 
or if IBES did not report forecasts made by any of the three 
top-ranked analysts. Because of this additional screen, Hypotheses 1A 
and IB are tested using 203 firms in 1980 and 153 in 1981, a subset of 
the firms described in Table 1. 
2 
The standard deviation deflator is updated monthly for the 
revisions of all consensus and individual analyst sources. The 
analyst forecasts used to measure the standard deviation, however, 
vary among the eight consensus sources. For consensus sources "Mean 
of All” and "Median of All", this deflator is the standard deviation 
of the distribution of all available analyst forecasts provided by 
IBES. (This is the standard deviation measure used by Imhoff and Lobo 
[1984]). For each of the other six consensus sources, this deflator 
is the standard deviation of the distribution of all analyst forecasts 
made within the corresponding inclusion period, (e.g. This deflator 
is the standard deviation of the distribution of all available analyst 
forecasts made in the previous month for the "1-Month Mean" and 
"1-Month Median".) 
For the individual analyst sources, this deflator is the standard 
deviation of the distribution of all analyst forecasts made within the 
previous three months. There is no theoretical justification for use 
of the three-month inclusion period in deflating individual analyst 
forecast revisions. For this sample, however, this inclusion period 
provides the most consistent measure of relative dispersion among the 
forecasts of alternative analysts. The three-month period is more 
appealing than longer inclusion periods because it more fully adjusts 
for outdated forecasts. Alternatively, the three-month period is more 
appealing than shorter inclusion periods (e.g. one month) because it 
results in fewer unusable deflators (SD.^ ^ = o) caused by only one 
analyst forecast made in the inclusion period. 
■a 
Other holding periods were also examined that included weeks 
before -7. The results were similar to those for holding period 
[-7,0] and are, therefore, not reported. 
^Because the relative magnitude of ECAR. may be dependent on the 
firm specific volatility of abnormal returns, this measure is used 
rather than the standardized measure employed by Imhoff and Lobo 
[1984] which adjusts for time-specific volatility. 
^The association between individual analyst forecast revisions of 
these three sources and CAR was not sensitive to exclusion of outlying 
cases, unlike the consensus revisions. As a result, Pearson 
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correlations may be more appropriate for analysis at the individual 
analyst level than at the consensus level. Both correlation 
coefficients were computed and results based on parameteric tests at 
the individual analyst level are discussed in Section 4.1.2. 
^This weighting scheme realistically assumes proceeds from short 
sales are not collected at the time of sale and that collateral is 
required. 
Equations (12) and (13) were also estimated with weekly forecast 
revisions, using (n x 52) observations for each analyst source. Use 
of a shorter holding period (one week vs. one month) may reduce the 
noise in the revision and ECAR measures and therefore improve the 
efficiency of the parameter estimates of Equation (12) and (13). On 
average, however, an analyst made eight revisions for each sample firm 
throughout each analysis year. REV measured on a weekly basis, 
therefore, contained on average eight non-zero observations and 44 
zero observations. With this limited variability in the independent 
variables of Equations (12) and (13), the models* explanatory power 
was weak for most industries. For this reason, the results using a 
monthly revision measure (REV ) are reported. 
In additions to Equations (12) and (13), the leading relationship 
between forecast revisions and risk-adjusted returns was examined 
using the following model: — ffi+1 = o0 + + e im. 
Across all analysts and industry groups examined, the coefficient 
was significant for only one analyst. Consequently, the results 




4.1 Results on Relative Information Content 
Hypotheses 1A and IB address the relative information content of 
consensus forecast sources and individual analyst sources, 
respectively. Empirical results relating to these two hypotheses are 
presented in Table 6 through Table 17. Results comparing the 
alternative consensus sources are discussed in Section 4.1.1 and 
results on the alternative individual analyst sources are examined in 
Section 4.1.2. The research design variations described in Chapter 
III are evaluated in both sections. Section 4.1.3 summarizes these 
results and evaluates comparisons across consensus and individual 
analyst sources. 
4.1.1 Consensus Results 
The Spearman rank correlation coefficients measured between ECAR 
and the revision variable REV(2) are reported for each of the eight 
consensus sources and for five alternative holding periods in Table 
6.^ Across most consensus sources and holding periods, these 
correlations are stronger for REV(2), the revision variable deflated 
by the standard deviation of forecasts, than for REV(1). For 
comparative purposes, the results using REV(1) are reported in Table 
Ai of Appendix A. This finding of a stronger association between ECAR 




CONSENSUS CORRELATION RESULTS 
USING ALTERNATIVE HOLDING PERIODS 
FULL SAMPLE 
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients and (Probabilities) 
Between ECAR and REV(2) 
Alternative Holding Periods 
Consensus 
Year Source [0] [-2,0] 
Mean of All .00 (.47) -.02 (.25) 
1-Month Mean .02 (.32) .01 (.42) 
2-Month Mean -.01 (.36) .00 (.43) 
3-Month Mean -.00 (.44) .01 (.36) 
[-3,0] [-7,0] [-2.+1] Numob 
02 (.20) .11 (.00) .02 (.24) 1694 
04 (.16) .08 (.02) .05 (.08) 819 
04 (.09) .09 (.00) .03 (.10) 1440 
04 (.07) .08 (.00) .04 (.07) 1633 
Median of All .02 (.24) .00 (.44) .05 (.04) .13 (.00) .03 (.12) 1218 
1-Month Median .00 (.48) -.01 (.39) .02 (.25) .10 (.00) .00 (.46) 771 
2-Month Median .01 (.38) .04 (.09) .04 (.06) .12 (.00) .05 (.03) 1228 
3-Month Median .03 (.18) .02 (.22) .04 (.06) .09 (.00) .05 (.04) 1298 
Mean of All .06 (.01) .04 (.08) .09 (.00) .20 (.00) .02 (.22) 1418 
1-Month Mean .06 (.01) .03 (.21) .11 (.00) .19 (.00) .02 (.32) 827 
2-Month Mean .05 (.03) .02 (.28) .09 (.00) .21 (.00) -.00 (.45) 1302 
3-Month Mean .07 (.00) .03 (.14) .08 (.00) .18 (.00) .01 (.34) 1398 
Median of All .08 (.00) .06 (.03) .10 (.00) .22 (.00) .04 (.11) 1061 
1-Month Median .06 (.04) .05 (.09) .12 (.00) .19 (.00) .02 (.25) 786 
2-Month Median .04 (.09) .03 (.19) .07 (.00) .20 (.00) .02 (.30) 1121 
3-Month Median .08 (.00) .05 (.04) .08 (.00) .20 (.00) .03 (.13) 1145 
Nuaob. = Number of observations 
All abnormal returns are measured using equal-weighted market model parameter estimates 
(ECAR). All consensus forecast revisions are deflated by the standard deviation 
measured around the associated consensus forecast (REV(2)). 
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result, all remaining consensus results are reported using REV(2). 
The correlations in Table 6 are reported separately for each of 
the two test years. Overall, the correlations appear weaker for 1980 
than in 1981, suggesting temporal sensitivity of measures of 
information content. In addition, the strength of the correlations 
appear to be sensitive to the holding period. In 1980, for example, 
none of the correlations for the eight consensus measures are 
significant until the holding period is expanded to [-3,0]. This 
finding is consistent with the notion that forecast revisions 
comprising the consensus are used by investors as they are made 
available throughout the one month period between monthly 
publications. The correlations for holding period [-3,0] are also 
stronger than those for [0] in 1981, further supporting this notion. 
Using holding period [-3,0], the significant association found 
between REV(2) and ECAR for most consensus sources in 1980 and for all 
sources in 1981 suggests that consensus forecast revisions (or 
information related to analyst forecast revisions) are used by 
investors. Security price changes, however, appear to precede some 
consensus revisions as indicated by the increase in the Spearman rank 
correlations when the holding period is expanded from [-3,0] to 
[-7,0]. Such a pattern is consistent with consensus measures 
including forecasts that lag the market and supports the findings of 
Givoly and Lakonishok [1979] and Brown, Foster and Noreen [1985]. 
The results presented in Table 6 also permit comparisons between 
holding periods [-3,0] and [-2,+1]. This latter holding period was 
used by Imhoff and Lobo [1984] and is equivalent to the calendar 
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month. The correlations are weaker for holding period [-2,+1] than 
for [-3,0] in 13 of the 16 comparisons (2 years x 8 sources), 
suggesting that consensus revisions are impounded in security prices 
by the revision week. It is interesting to note that the correlation 
between the revisions of the "Mean of All" and ECAR for [-2,+1] are 
not significant at conventional significance levels for either 1980 or 
1981. The finding suggests that the significant correlation results 
reported by Imhoff and Lobo [1984] using this consensus measure and 
holding period may be time- or sample-specific. For the sample and 
time period of this study, the holding period [-3,0] provides a better 
measure of the information content of consensus revisions. 
As shown in Table 6, the choice of the holding period affects the 
comparisons among the correlation coefficients of the eight consensus 
sources. In 1980, for two of the holding periods the magnitude of the 
correlation coefficients between ECAR and the revisions of the "Median 
of All" is stronger than that for the other consensus revisions. For 
two other holding periods in this same year, however, the correlation 
between ECAR and the "2-Month Median" revisions is larger than the 
other consensus sources. In 1981, the "Median of All" revisions are 
more strongly associated with ECAR than the revisions of other sources 
in four of the holding periods. For the other 1981 holding period, 
the magnitude of the correlation coefficients between ECAR and the 
revisions of the "1-Month Median" is largest. 
To facilitate further analysis of the significance of these 
differences among consensus sources, all further consensus results are 
reported for holding period [-3,0]. This holding period is selected 
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over holding periods [0], [-2,0] and [-2,+1] because it yields 
stronger correlation coefficients for most consensus measures, as 
indicated in Table 6. Holding period [-3*0] is selected over [-7,0] 
because this shorter period better isolates the security price changes 
related to a particular consensus revision, as discussed in Section 
3.4. By excluding price changes that may be related to other events 
occurring in the period [-7,-6,-5,-4], the information content of 
alternative consensus revisions may be more directly measured by using 
holding period [-3,0] than by using holding period [-7,0]. 
For holding period [-3,0], the sensitivity of these Spearman rank 
correlation coefficients to the CAR definition is examined in Table 7. 
The first column of Table 7 represents the correlations between 
consensus revisions and ECAR for [-3,0] as reported in Table 6. By 
comparing the correlations across rows, there appears to be little 
difference in the magnitude of the correlations when VCAR, SCAR, MCAR 
or ACAR are used as alternative abnormal return measures. Some 
general observations can be made. Use of value-weighted CARs in 1981 
results in the largest increase in correlation coefficients relative 
to ECAR. In 1980, however, the correlations for some of the consensus 
measures are lower than those using ECAR, suggesting that the choice 
of a market index that results in stronger relationships between 
earnings variables and CAR may be year specific. The differences 
between correlations using ECAR and SCAR and using ECAR and MCAR are 
also small and inconsistent from one year to the next. For all eight 
consensus measures and both years, the association between the 
consensus revisions and the adjusted CAR (ACAR) is stronger than for 
Table 7 
CONSENSUS CORRELATION RESULTS USING ALTERNATIVE CAR MEASURES 
FULL SAMPLE 
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients and (Probabilities) 
Between Alternative CAR Measures and REV(2) 
Alternative CAR Measures 
Equal- 
Consensus Wted 
Year Source (ECAR) 
Value- Standard- Mean- 
Wted ized Corrct 




Mean of All .02 (.20) .03 (.16) .03 (.15) .01 (.29) .04 (.05) 
1-Month Mean .04 (.16) .03 (.22) .03 (.17) .03 (.21) .04 (.11) 
2-Month Mean .04 (.09) .03 (.14) .04 (.08) .03 (.12) .05 (.04) 
3-Month Mean .04 (.07) .04 (.05) .04 (.05) .03 (.09) .05 (.02) 
Median of All .05 (.04) .06 (.02) .06 (.02) .05 (.05) .07 (.01) 
1-Month Median .02 (.25) .02 (.33) .03 (.23) .02 (.28) .03 (.18) 
2-Month Median .04 (.06) .04 (.09) .05 (.04) .04 (.08) .05 (.03) 
3-Month Median .04 (.06) .04 (.08) .05 (.04) .04 (.08) .06 (.02) 
Mean of All .09 (.00) .12 (.00) .10 (.00) .11 (.00) .10 (.00) 
1-Month Mean .11 (.00) .15 (.00) .12 (.00) .14 (.00) .12 (.00) 
2-Month Mean .09 (.00) .12 (.00) .09 (.00) .11 (.00) .09 (.00) 
3-Month Mean .08 (.00) .11 (.00) .09 (.00) .10 (.00) .08 (.00) 
Median of All .10 (.00) .13 (.00) .10 (.00) .13 (.00) .11 (.00) 
1-Month Median .12 (.00) .15 (.00) .12 (.00) .14 (.00) .13 (.00) 
2-Month Median .07 (.01) .10 (.00) .08 (.00) .09 (.00) .07 (.01) 
3-Month Median .08 (.00) .11 (.00) .09 (.00) .10 (.00) .08 (.00) 
All CARs are measured using holding period [-3,0]. All consensus forecast 
revisions are deflated by the standard deviation measured around the associated 
consensus forecast (REV(2)). 
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correlations using ECAR. While this consistency suggests that 
controlling for price and measurement error results in ACAR being a 
more efficient measure of abnormal returns, the differences between 
correlations using ECAR and ACAR are small. 
Comparing the eight consensus measures using Table 7, the 
revisions of the "Median of All" have the strongest association with 
all five CAR measures in 1980. In 1981, the revisions of the "1-Month 
Median" have the strongest association for most CAR measures. Because 
the alternative CAR measures do not appear to alter inferences about 
the relative association between consensus revisions and abnormal 
returns, the remaining consensus results are reported for the ECAR 
2 measure. 
Table 8 presents the weighted CAR results for each of the eight 
consensus measures using ECAR and holding period [-3,0]. This 
weighted CAR represents the abnormal return that would be earned if 
investment in the sample firms were made in relationship to the 
revision’s sign and magnitude at the beginning of week -3 and held to 
the end of the revision week. The first column for each year presents 
the weighted CAR results for the entire sample of revisions. 
Comparing the magnitude of these weighted CARs across consensus 
sources indicates that the largest weighted CAR is obtained when the 
revisions of the "1-Month Mean" are used in this investment strategy. 
Unlike the previous findings using correlation tests, weighted CAR 
results suggest one consensus measure, "1-Month Mean" best proxies for 
market expectations for both 1980 and 1981 for this sample. Similar 
results are also found when only the downward revisions are examined. 
64 
Table 8 
WEIGHTED CAR RESULTS FOR CONSENSUS SOURCES 
FULL SAMPLE 
Percentage CAR of a Portfolio with Weights Determined by 
Magnitude of the Consensus Revision 
Consensus 
Source 
1980 Wted CAR 1981 Wted CAR 
All REV (+) REV (-) REV All REV ( + ) REV (-) REV 
Mean of All -0.2556 0.22% -0.6456 0.6256 1.1056 0.4856 
1-Month Mean 1.04 1.33 0.79 0.80 0.66 0.85 
2-Month Mean 0.90 1.68 0.24 0.64 0.91 0.54 
3-Month Mean 0.37 1.12 -0.26 0.69 1.06 0.54 
Median of All 0.17 0.74 -0.28 0.57 0.93 0.46 
1-Month Median 0.47 0.88 -0.79 0.69 1.32 0.46 
2-Month Median 0.70 1.12 0.31 0.28 0.62 0.14 
3-Month Median 0.30 0.92 -0.20 0.40 0.94 0.18 
Wted CARs are measured using equal-weighted market model 
estimates (ECAR) and holding period [-3*0]. 
parameter 
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This result is not found for the subsample of upward revisions and 
provides additional evidence that the manner in which investors use 
forecast revisions may depend on the nature of the forecast revisions. 
The results of Table 8 suggest that the distinction between good 
news and bad news revisions may be important in understanding how 
investors use analyst forecasts. Up to this point, the sign and 
magnitude of the revision has been determined separately for each 
consensus source. Of additional interest, however, is how the 
revisions compare across the eight alternative consensus measures. 
The sign of the alternative consensus revisions are compared in Table 
9. These results examine the 866 cases where the data screens are met 
for all 8 consensus measures in 1980 and the 895 cases in 1981, and 
they clearly show that the eight consensus measures do not result in 
the same classification of earnings forecast revisions in a given 
month. Focusing on the three revision classifications (0, +, -), 
there is agreement in 333 instances (38.4$) in 1980 and 362 instances 
(40.4$) in 1981. As a result, one consensus may indicate good news at 
a point in time, while the revisions of another consensus measure may 
indicate bad news. 
Both the sign and magnitude of the alternative consensus 
revisions are compared in Table 10 to determine which source provides 
revisions most consistent with security price changes. The Spearman 
rank correlation coefficients reported in this table measure the 
marginal information content of the revisions of each alternative 
consensus source over and above the information content of the ’’Mean 
of All” revisions. In Table 10, the correlation coefficients are 
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Table 9 
COMPARISON OF CONSENSUS SOURCES USING SIGN OF REVISION 
FULL SAMPLE 
Number of Observations (Obs.) in Monthly Forecast Revision Categories 







Source (0) (+) (-) Categories 
Mean of All 49 379 438 866 
1-Month Mean 68 381 417 tt 
2-Month Mean 57 363 446 it 
3-Month Mean 68 363 435 it 
Median of All 222 296 348 n 
1-Month Median 115 361 390 it 
2-Month Median 171 314 381 ii 
3-Month Median 204 292 370 it 
Number of Obs. 
in which all 8 
Consensus agree: 4 145 184 333 
Mean of All 63 225 607 895 
1-Month Mean 68 280 547 ti 
2-Month Mean 44 246 605 it 
3-Month Mean 45 245 605 it 
Median of All 231 157 507 it 
1-Month Median 109 266 520 it 
2-Month Median 150 212 533 it 
3-Month Median 182 195 518 ti 
Number of Obs. 
in which all 8 
Consensus agree: 1 63 298 362 
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Table 10 
COMPARISON OF CONSENSUS SOURCES USING MAGNITUDE OF REVISION 
FULL SAMPLE 
Spearman Rank Correlations (Corr.) and Probabilities (Prob.) 
Between ECAR and (REV.... .. _ _ rev., ^ ) 




Corr. Prob. Numob. Corr. Prob. Numob 
1-Month Mean .058 (.05) 827 .107 (.00) 843 
2-Month Mean .053 (.03) 1360 .075 (.00) 1285 
3-Month Mean .032 (.11) 1526 .052 (.03) 1372 
Median of All .045 (.03) 1660 -.009 (.37) 1367 
1-Month Median .036 (.15) 831 .094 (.00) 851 
2-Month Median .050 (.03) 1387 .034 (.11) 1271 
3-Month Median .034 (.09) 1566 .016 (.27) 1381 
Numob. = Number of observations 
All abnormal returns are measured using equal-weighted market model 
parameter estimates (ECAR) and holding period [-3,0]. All consensus 
forecast revisions are deflated by the standard deviation measured 
around the associated consensus forecast (REV(2)). 
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positive and significant at the .05 level in eight of the fourteen 
paired comparisons (7 sources x 2 years) and suggest that the 
revisions of several alternative consensus measures are significantly 
more consistent with market movements than those provided by the 
conventional ’’Mean of All”.3 
In both 1980 and 1981, as indicated in Table 10, the Spearman 
rank correlation coefficient is largest for the "1-Month Mean”. This 
finding supports the weighted CAR results that the best single proxy 
of market expectations is the ”1-Month Mean". In addition, the 
correlations of the alternative mean consensus measures in 1980 and 
1981 decrease as the inclusion period is increased from one month to 
three months. A similar pattern is found for the alternative median 
consensus measures in 1981• Such a pattern supports the use of 
corrections for outdated forecasts and suggests that investors use a 
one-month inclusion period to distinguish between current and outdated 
forecasts. 
The results of Table 8 and 10 support the use of the ”1-Month 
Mean” as a proxy for market expectations. These results, however, are 
derived using all available consensus revisions and may, therefore, be 
sensitive to the inclusion of confounding events. To control for 
potentially confounding events, the weighted CARs reported in Table 11 
are computed for the subsample that excludes revision-weeks that 
coincide with actual earnings or management forecast announcements. 
As in Table 8, the weighted CARs for the subsample are measured using 
ECAR and holding period [-3>0]. In most cases, these weighted CARs 
are less than those reported in Table 8 for the full sample, 
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Table 11 
WEIGHTED CAR RESULTS FOR CONSENSUS SOURCES 
SUBSAMPLE 
Percentage CAR of a Portfolio with Weights Determined by 
Magnitude of the Consensus Revision 
Consensus 
Source 
1980 Wted CAR 1981 Wted CAR 
All REV (+) REV (-) REV All REV (+) REV (-) REV 
Mean of All -0.34$ 0.20$ -0.77* 0.50$ 1.13* 0.31* 
1-Month Mean 0.93 1.46 0.45 0.70 0.93 0.62 
2-Month Mean 0.84 1.48 0.27 0.60 1.05 0.41 
3-Month Mean 0.28 0.91 -0.25 0.65 1.19 0.43 
Median of All -0.01 0.60 -0.50 0.43 0.82 0.30 
1-Month Median 0.26 0.04 0.44 0.54 1.55 0.14 
2-Month Median 0.48 0.81 0.22 0.24 0.81 -0.01 
3-Month Median 0.17 0.70 -0.27 0.32 0.99 0.03 
Wted CARs are measured using equal-weighted market model parameter 
estimates (ECAR) and holding period [-3,0]. 
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suggesting that some of the information contained in analyst forecast 
revisions may reiterate information from other earnings sources. The 
use of a subsample, however, increases the marginal information 
content of the revisions of most alternative consensus measures, as 
reported in Table 12. In both Table 11 and 12, the "1-Month Mean" 
provides the largest weighted CAR and strongest marginal information 
content, despite the potential confounding effects of other earnings 
information releases that occurred at the same time. 
The consistent results of Table 10 and 12 suggest that correction 
for outdated analyst forecasts improves a consensus measure as a proxy 
for market expectations. The implications of this result may extend 
beyond earnings information content studies. With the increased 
availability of the IBES summary data, more areas of financial and 
accounting research are using the standard deviation of individual 
analyst forecasts around the "Mean of All" as a measure of divergence 
of opinion. This divergence of opinion measure has been used in 
studies on heterogeneous expectations (Peterson and Peterson [1984], 
Malkiel [1982], and Vander Weide and Carleton [1985]), alternative 
risk measures (Carvell, Strebel [1984]), the analysis of the implied 
standard deviation of option pricing models (Ajinkya and Gift [1985]), 
and the evaluation of financial analyst forecast superiority (Brown, 
Richardson and Schwager [1986]). The results of this study suggest 
that a divergence of opinion measure derived using all analyst 
forecasts may capture not only dispersion among analysts but also 
outdatedness. For example, a large standard deviation of analyst 
forecasts for a given firm may indicate wide disagreement among 
71 
Table 12 
COMPARISON OF CONSENSUS SOURCES USING MAGNITUDE OF REVISION 
SUBSAMPLE 
Spearman Rank Correlations (Corr.) and Probabilities (Prob.) 
Between ECAR and (REV.n, . . _ rev., „ 




Corr. Prob. Numob. Corr. Prob. Numob. 
1-Month Mean .063 (.04) 728 .104 (.00) 771 
2-Month Mean .062 c.01) 1207 .082 (.00) 1177 
3-Month Mean .037 (.09) 1356 .065 (.01) 1260 
Median of All .037 (.08) 1488 -.010 (.36) 1264 
1-Month Median .050 (.09) 733 .084 (.01) 778 
2-Month Median .059 (.02) 1230 .043 (.07) 1166 
3-Month Median .025 (.18) 1396 .015 (.30) 1271 
Numob. = Number of observations 
All abnormal returns are measured using equal-weighted market model 
parameter estimates (ECAR) and holding period [-3,0]. All consensus 
forecast revisions are deflated by the standard deviation measured 
around the associated consensus forecast (REV(2)). 
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analysts and/or a large number of outdated forecasts included in the 
"Mean of All" consensus measure. 
Table 13 reports the average monthly mean, standard deviation and 
coefficient of variations for the "Mean of All" and the "1-Month 
Mean". By omitting potentially outdated forecasts, the monthly 
coefficient of variation for the "1-Month Mean" is smaller than that 
of the "Mean of All" in all but five of the 24 comparisons (12 months 
x 2 years), suggesting that this consensus source may provide a better 
proxy for divergence of opinion. In addition the pattern in the 
monthly coefficient of variation over each of the test years is 
sensitive to the consensus source, indicating that control for 
outdated forecasts may affect the inferences of previous studies.2* 
4.1.2 Individual Analyst Results 
Table 14 presents the Spearman rank correlation coefficients 
between ECAR and the revisions of each of the three individual analyst 
sources (First, Largest and All-American). The differences in 
correlations across analyst sources suggest that the three alternative 
selection criteria identify different analysts for most firms. The 
number of firms for which the selection criteria identified the same 
analyst are as follows: 
1980 1981 
First = Largest 25 38 
First = All-American 17 7 
Largest = All-American 21 19 
While there are some instances where there is agreement among the 
selection criteria, the same analyst is identified using two 
Table 13 
ALTERNATIVE DIVERGENCE OF OPINION MEASURES 
FULL SAMPLE 
Monthly Dispersion Measures 
Using ’’Mean of All’’ and ”1 -Month Mean” 
Mean of All 
1980 
1-Month Mean 
Month Ave Mean Ave SD Ave CV Ave Mean Ave SD Ave CV 
Jan $4.91 $.42 .090 $4.69 $.24 .051 
Feb 4.97 .43 .098 5.47 .34 .066 
Mar 5.05 .43 .181 5.47 .40 .074 
Apr 5.21 .43 .094 5.23 .39 .106 
May 4.98 .42 .124 5.50 .41 .095 
Jun 4.82 .41 .148 4.95 .40 .098 
Jul 4.71 .38 .116 4.83 .37 .126 
Aug 4.65 .37 .098 4.72 .34 .090 
Sep 5.04 .34 .083 5.16 .24 .080 
Oct 4.84 .29 .074 4.98 .29 .070 
Nov 4.83 .28 .073 5.09 .23 .048 
Dec 4.87 .26 .065 5.07 .19 .058 
Mean of All 
1981 
1- Month Mean 
Month Ave Mean Ave SD Ave CV Ave Mean Ave SD Ave CV 
Jan $5-42 $.41 .095 $5.61 $.40 .081 
Feb 5.41 .41 .149 5.63 .38 .084 
Mar 5.33 .39 .116 5.38 .37 .093 
Apr 5.26 .39 . 109 5.26 .36 .112 
May 5.23 .38 .401 5.39 .35 .077 
Jun 5.06 .36 .089 5.01 .35 .085 
Jul 4.85 .36 .089 4.78 .26 .077 
Aug 4.77 .35 .084 4.63 .27 .072 
Sep 4.70 .33 .085 4.72 .26 .074 
Oct 4.60 .33 .095 4.73 .35 .106 
Nov 4.38 .34 .139 4.33 .27 .165 
Dec 4.24 .30 .215 4.29 .25 .150 
SD = standard deviation around consensus measure 
CV = coefficient of variation 
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Table 14 
INDIVIDUAL ANALYST CORRELATION RESULTS 
USING ALTERNATIVE HOLDING PERIODS 
FULL SAMPLE 
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients and (Probabilities) 
Between ECAR and REV(1) 
Alternative Holding Periods 
Analyst 
Year Source ( 0 ] [-1 , o] [-3, 0] [-7. 0] to, +1] Numob 
1980 First .03 (.26) .01 (.45) .02 (.35) .09 (.03) .02 (.31) 467 
Largest -.02 (.35) -.04 (.23) -.02 (.35) -.02 (.33) -.00 (.49) 451 
All-American .07 (.07) .12 (.00) .07 (.08) .13 (.00) .03 (.27) 496 
1981 First .10 (.02) .04 (.17) .08 (.04) .22 (.00) .06 (.12) 452 
Largest .12 (.00) .09 (.03) .03 (.29) .22 (.00) .09 (.01) 447 
All-American .08 (.05) .06 (.11) .09 (.02) .18 (.00) .10 (.01) 496 
Numob. = Number of observations 
All abnormal returns are measured using equal-weighted market model parameter estimates 
(ECAR). All individual analyst forecast revisions are deflated by the absolute value 
of the analyst’s previous forecast (REV(1)). 
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alternative criteria for, on average, only 1256 of the sample firms. 
The correlations for each analyst source and five holding periods 
are reported in Table 14.^ Across almost all analyst sources and all 
holding periods examined, the Spearman correlation coefficients are 
larger for REV(1), the revision variable deflated by the absolute 
value of the previous forecast, than for REV(2). This finding 
confirms the results of Elgers, Callahan and Strock [1986]. 
Consequently, all remaining results using individual analyst forecasts 
are reported for this deflator. For comparative purposes, the results 
using REV(2) are reported in Table B1 of Appendix B. 
In 1980 only the revisions of the "All-American" source are 
significantly associated with ECAR, as reported in Table 14. Across 
all 5 holding periods, the Spearman rank correlations are larger than 
those reported for "First" and "Largest". This finding suggests that 
the "All-American" analyst is more closely followed by investors and, 
therefore, better proxies for market expectations in 1980 than the 
other two individual analyst sources. The changes in the 
"All-American" correlation across holding periods suggests that most 
of the revision information is impounded in security prices during the 
period [-1,0]. When the holding period is expanded from [0] to [0,+1] 
the correlation decreases from .07 to .03 and when it is expanded from 
[-1,0] to [-3,0] the correlation decreases from .12 to .07. As 
expected, therefore, the information related to individual analyst 
forecast revisions appears to be incorporated over shorter periods 
than that related to consensus revisions. 
76 
The pattern and relative information content of the three 
alternative individual analyst sources is different, however, in 1981. 
For three of the five holding periods, the revisions of the ’’Largest” 
source are more highly correlated with ECAR and in the remaining two 
holding periods the "All-American" revisions are more highly 
correlated with ECAR than the other two analyst sources. The 
revisions of the "First" and "Largest" sources appear to be largely 
impounded in security prices in week 0, as the correlations for 
holding period [0] are larger than for holding periods [-1,0], [-3,0] 
and [0,+1]. For the "All-American" source, however, the Spearman rank 
correlation increases when the holding period [0] is expanded to 
[0,+1], indicating that not all information relating to the revisions 
of the "All-American" analyst is impounded in security prices by the 
revision week. Such varied patterns suggest that the timing in which 
analyst information is incorporated in security prices may be 
sensitive to the choice of analyst. Because the holding period [-7,0] 
yields the strongest association for all analyst sources examined in 
1981, as well as in 1980, these three analyst sources also appear to 
lag the market for certain firms and/or during certain times in the 
test years. 
The results presented in Table 14 for 1981 suggest that the 
relative information content of individual analyst sources may be 
sensitive to the holding period examined. While tests of Hypothesis 
IB are conducted using all holding periods, only the results 
associated with holding period [0] are reported. This holding period 
is selected for two reason. First, the association between analyst 
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revisions and ECAR is more significantly positive for holding period 
[0] than for [-1,0] for all three sources in 1981 and two sources in 
1980. The association for holding period [0] is also more 
significantly positive than for [0,+1] for all three sources in 1980 
and two sources in 1981. Secondly, this shorter holding period allows 
one to compare the contemporaneous association between analyst 
revisions and ECAR, one that is expected to be significant for 
market-leading analysts. Longer holding periods such as [-7,0] 
capture lagging relationships and may be less effective in 
discriminating a market leader from followers. 
The sensitivity of the Spearman rank correlation coefficients to 
CAR definition is examined in Table 15. The effect of using 
alternative CAR measures on the association between CAR and individual 
analyst forecast revisions is similar to that reported for consensus 
revisions. In both years, the magnitude of the association is only 
moderately affected and the ranking of the correlations across the 
three sources is largely unaffected by the choice of CAR measure. 
Only results for ECAR are, therefore, reported in the remainder of 
this dissertation.^ 
Weighted CAR results reported in Panel A of Table 16 reinforce 
the Spearman rank correlation results of Table 14. In 1980 an 
investment strategy using the revisions of the "All-American" source 
yields the largest abnormal returns over holding period [0] relative 
to the other two analyst sources. This finding holds true for the 
three samples examined (all revisions, upward revisions, and downward 
revisions). In 1981, an investment strategy using the revisions of 
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Table 15 
INDIVIDUAL ANALYST CORRELATION RESULTS 
USING ALTERNATIVE CAR MEASURES 
FULL SAMPLE 
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients and (Probabilities) 
Between Alternative CAR Measures and REV(1) 



















1980 First .03 (.26) .01 (.42) .04 (.19) .01 (.39) .04 (.21) 
Largest -.02 (.35) -.04 (.19) -.03 (.27) -.05 (.17) -.01 (.38) 
All-American .07 (.07) .07 (.07) .07 (.07) .05 (.13) .07 (.06) 
1981 First .10 (.02) • 13 (.00) .09 (.03) .12 (.00) .12 (.01) 
Largest .12 (.00) .12 (.00) .13 (.00) .12 (.01) .12 (.01) 
All-American .08 (.05) .09 (.02) .07 (.05) .08 (.03) .09 (.02) 
All CARs are measured using holding period [0]. All individual analyst 
forecast revisions are deflated by the absolute value of the analyst's previous 
earnings forecast (REV(1)). 
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Table 16 
COMPARISON OF INDIVIDUAL ANALYST SOURCES 
FULL SAMPLE 
Panel A: Weighted CAR Results for Full Sample 
1980 Wted CAR 1981 Wted CAR 














Wted CAR is percentage CAR of a portfolio where security weights are 
determined by the magnitude of the analyst revision. It is measured 
using ECAR and holding period [0]. 
Panel B: Kendall and Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Full Sample 
1980 1981 
Kendall Pearson Kendall Pearson 
Correlation Correlation Correlation Correlation 
Analyst: 
First .02 (.27) .00 (.49) .07 (.02) .08 (.04) 
Largest -.01 (.36) .02 (.31) .08 (.00) .09 (.03) 
All-American .05 (.07) .12 (.00)«* .05 (.04) .03 (.27) 
**The Pearson correlation coefficient for the "All-American" source 
differs from that of ’'First" at alpha of .06, using a two -tail test. 
All other comparisons are not significant at alpha level of (.10). 
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the "Largest" source yields the largest abnormal return for all 
revisions and the subsample including only upward revisions. For the 
downward revisions subsample, however, the revisions of the "First" 
source provide the best investment strategy. As with the consensus 
analysis, therefore, the results are sensitive to the direction of the 
revisions. 
While the results of Panel A in Table 16 suggest that there is a 
difference between the three individual analyst sources, Panel B of 
this table reports the significance of these differences. Using 
holding period [0] and ECAR, Kendall correlation coefficients are 
reported for each of the three analyst sources. The Kendall 
correlation coefficients are uniformly lower (in absolute value) than 
the Spearman rank order correlations. For 1980 and 1981, none of the 
correlations are significantly different from the other two at the .10 
level. 
If the distribution of these variables is normal, then a 
parametric test using Pearson correlations is a more powerful test of 
differences in correlation. Fisher’s test, as described by Snedecor 
[1956, pp. 178-179], is used to compare the Pearson correlations 
reported in Panel B of Table 16. For 1980, the correlation 
coefficient for the "All-American" analyst is significantly different 
from that of the "First" at the .06 level of significance. All other 
differences between the correlations of these sources in 1980 and 1981 
are not significant. 
Similar results are found in Table 17 when revisions made during 
the week of a management forecast or actual earnings announcement are 
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Table 17 
COMPARISON OF INDIVIDUAL ANALYST SOURCES 
SUBSAMPLE 
Panel A: Weighted CAR Results for Subsample 
1980 Wted CAR 1981 Wted CAR 























Wted CAR is percentage CAR of a portfolio where security weights are 
determined by the magnitude of the analyst revision. It is measured 
using ECAR and holding period [0]. 










.02 (.29) -.01 (.43) 
.01 (.38) .04 (.23) 
.05 (.08) .11 (.01)** 
.07 (.01) .08 (.06) 
.05 (.08) .05 (.16) 
.04 (.10) .02 (.34) 
**The Pearson correlation coefficient for the "All-American" source 
differs from that of "First" at alpha of .06, using a two-tail test. 
All other comparisons are not significant at alpha level of (.10). 
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excluded. In Panel A of Table 17, the 1980 weighted CAR is larger for 
a portfolio selected on the basis of "All-American" revisions than on 
the revisions of the alternative analyst sources. In 1981, the 
weighted CAR is larger for the "First" or "Largest" analyst source, 
dependent on the subsample examined. Panel B of Table 17 reports a 
significant difference between the Kendall correlation of the 
"All-American" and the "First" analyst source at the .08 level of 
significance. This significant difference is similar to that reported 
for the full sample in Panel B of Table 16, as is the non-significant 
difference between the other analyst sources in 1980 and 1981. These 
results suggest that the differences and similarities among individual 
analyst sources persist after controlling for confounding events. 
4.1.3 Summary of Relative Information Content Results 
The results of this study indicate that the information content 
of analyst revisions, as measured by correlations between revision 
measures and abnormal security returns, is not generally equivalent 
across analyst sources. Using an equal-weighted CAR measure and 
holding period [-3,0], revisions of the "1-Month Mean" consensus 
measure are found to have significant marginal information content 
over and above the revisions of a more commonly-used consensus 
measure. By considering the timing of analyst forecasts and excluding 
forecasts that have not been revised within one month, a consensus 
forecast can be measured that better proxies for market expectations 
for this sample 
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While this analysis suggests that the association between 
consensus revisions and abnormal return measures is sensitive to 
alternative research designs, revision variables deflated by the 
variability of analyst forecasts and abnormal returns measured over 
the holding period [-3,0] provide stronger associations than other 
designs used in previous studies. 
Information content measures also differ across the three 
individual analyst sources examined in this study. While 
nonparametric tests found no significant differences between ECAR and 
the revisions of the "First”, "Largest" and "All-American" sources, 
only the revisions of the "All-American" are significantly related to 
risk-adjusted security returns in both test years of this analysis. 
In addition, the association between 1980 "All-American" revisions and 
ECAR are significantly different from that of another analyst source 
when parameteric tests are used. 
Analysis of alternative research designs at the individual 
analyst level suggests that using revision variables deflated by an 
analyst's previous forecast (in absolute value) and one-week abnormal 
returns may improve measures of information content than when other 
designs are used. 
The strength of the revision-return associations at the consensus 
and individual analyst level are stronger for 1981 than 1980. Given 
the different market conditions of these two years, the relationship 
between analyst forecast revisions and security returns may be 
7 
sensitive to market expectations of the overall economy. 
Alternatively, increased noise in the data due to longer reporting 
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lags or other factors may have resulted in the weaker associations 
found in 1980. 
Up to this point, no direct comparisons between consensus 
measures and individual analyst forecast measures have been made. 
Because of the differences in the disclosure period of consensus and 
individual analyst revisions, direct comparisons must be evaluated 
using alternative holding periods. Segments of Table 6 and Table 14 
are reproduced here to compare the Spearman rank correlations of the 
”1-Month Mean" and the "All-American" for the holding periods [0] and 
[-3,0]: 
Year Source Holding Period 
[0] [-3.0] 












Comparisons of these selected Spearman rank correlations indicate that 
the revisions of the "All-American" source are more strongly 
associated with ECAR than those of the "1-Month Mean" for holding 
period [0]. For holding period [-3,0], however, the difference in 
coefficients is reduced in 1980 and reversed in 1981. These 
differences are not significant when tested using Kendall correlation 
tests. For this sample and test period, however, the comparisons do 
suggest that the "All-American" analyst source may be a more 
appropriate measure of expected earnings than the "1-Month Mean" in 
studies that need to identify the release of information over a short 
period of time, such as in those studies examining the interaction 
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between multiple sources of information (Jennings [1984] and Imhoff 
and Lobo [1985]) or examining information transfers (Foster [1981] and 
Elgers, Callahan and Schneeweis [1985]). 
4.2 Results on Marginal Information Content 
The second hypothesis of this study states that the revisions of 
alternative analysts provide no marginal information content over and 
above the revisions of a market-leading analyst. Results relating to 
Hypothesis 2 are presented in Tables 18, 19 and 20. In an effort to 
identify which analysts may be market leaders, the contemporaneous 
correlation between monthly revision variables (REV(1)) and ECAR are 
examined using Equation (12) and the six industry groups listed in 
Table 4.® For three of these industry groups, the contemporaneous 
associations between REV(1) and ECAR are significant for at least one 
analyst each year. Results, therefore, are presented for these three 
industries: Paper, Machinery and Electrical Equipment. Individual 
analysts are identified by number to preserve anonymity. 
For each industry and year, at least two analysts provided 
revisions that were contemporaneously corrrelated with security 
returns. These analysts with significant contemporaneous correlations 
are labeled "Market Leaders" in Section A and D of Tables 18, 19 and 
20. Alternatively, some analysts appear to lag the market, as 
indicated by the significant association between the analysts’ monthly 
forecast revisions and the previous month's abnormal return. These 




MARGINAL INFORMATION CONTENT RESULTS 
Industry Group: Paper 
1980 A. Market Leaders: 
Analyst Source #43 
Analyst Source #55 












B. Market Laggers: 
Analyst Source #29 r(CARm-1> REVm) = .322 
C. Marginal Information Content: 
RM: CAR = aQ+ai(REV43)+e R2= *224 
UM: CAR = dQ+<i1(REV]43)-Kl2(REV55)+d3(REV33)+e R2= *282 
Incremental F = 1.29 
1981 D. Market Leaders: 
Analyst Source #31 
Analyst Source #22 
rCCAS^, REVffl) = .333 
r(CARm, revd) = .290 
E. Market Laggers: 
Analyst Source #33 
Analyst Source #19 
r<CAVl> REV = *357 
r(CAVl> REVn) = .310 
Marginal Information Content: 
RM: CAR = a0+ai(REV31)+e r2= .119 
UM: CAR = dQ+<l1(REV31)+d2(REV22)+e r2= .160 
Incremental F = 2.91 (.10) 
CAR = ECAR for month nm" 
RE* = Revision made in month "m" deflated by /FAF/ of previous month 
m RM = Restricted Model, UM = Unrestricted Model 
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Table 19 
MARGINAL INFORMATION CONTENT RESULTS 
Industry Group: Machinery 
1980 A. Market Leaders: 
Analyst Source #16 
Analyst Source #43 
Analyst Source #17 
Analyst Source #15 







B. Market Laggers: 
Analyst Source #23 









C. Marginal Information Content: 
RM: CAR = aQ+ai(REVl6)+e R2= *103 
UM: CAR = d0+d1(REVl6)+d2(REV43)+d3(REV17) 
+d4(REV15)+e R2= .204 
Incremental F = 2.42 (.10) 
1981 D. Market Leaders: 
Analyst Source #19 
Analyst Source #37 












E. Market Laggers: 
Analyst Source #27 









F. Marginal Information Content: 
RM: CAR = (REV19)+e -°97 
UM: CAR = d0+d1(REV19)+d2(REV37)+d3(REV32)+e R2= •132 
Incremental F = 1.13 
CAR = ECAR for month "m" 
REVm = Revision made in month "m" deflated by /FAF/ of previous month 
m RM = Restricted Model, UM = Unrestricted Model 
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Table 20 
MARGINAL INFORMATION CONTENT RESULTS 
Industry Group: Electrical Equipment 
1980 A. Market Leaders: 
Analyst Source #33 
Analyst Source #2 
Analyst Source #32 
r CAR , REVra) = .351 
r CAR , REVm) = .297 
r(CARm, REVm) = .215 
B. Market Laggers: 
Analyst Source #19 
Analyst Source #16 







REVm) = .514 
REVm) =-.385 
REVm) = .354 
C. 
1981 D. 
Marginal Information Content: 
RM: CAR = aQ+ai(REV33)+e r2= .129 
UM: CAR = d0+d1(REV33)+d2(REV2)+d3(REV32)+e R2= .299 
Incremental F = 3*90 (.05) 
Market Leaders: 
Analyst Source #33 r(CARm> REVm) = *373 
Analyst Source #32 r(CARm> REVm) = .252 
E. Market Laggers: 
Analyst Source #27 
Analyst Source #25 













F. Marginal Information Content! 
RM: CAR = aQ+ai(REV33)+e R2= *127 
UM: CAR = d0+d1(REV33)+d2(REV32)+e R2= *192 
Incremental F = 2.85 (.10) 
CAR = ECAR for month "m" 
REV111 = Revision made in month "m" deflated by /FAF/ of previous month 
m RM = Restricted Model, UM = Unrestricted Model 
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These results suggest that market leaders and laggers exist in 
the analyst community. The market leaders and laggers for the first 
two industry groups (Paper and Machinery), however, are inconsistent 
from one year to the next. This inconsistency suggests that market 
leaders maintain this status for only a short time. Assuming 
investors can identify which analyst provides more accurate forecasts 
in a given year, this finding supports the results of Brown and Rozeff 
[1980] who report that an individual analyst’s forecast accuracy is 
inconsistent from one year to the next. 
Consistent leaders and laggers, however, are found for the 
Electrical Equipment industry as reported in Table 20. Both analyst 
#33 and #32 are identified as leaders in 1980 and 1981. In addition, 
analyst #25 is identified as a market lagger in both years. This 
consistency in market leaders combined with the results of Brown and 
Rozeff [1980] suggest that for some industries, reputation may lag 
performance. More definitive results concerning this issue await 
additional years of data. 
Sections C and F of Tables 18, 19 and 20 report the incremental 
F-statistic used to examine marginal information content. Three of 
the six computed F-statistics (3 industries x 2 years) are significant 
at the .10 level. If the six F-tests are independent, there is a 
probability of .02 that three or more of these F-statistics are 
significant at the .10 level. These findings suggest that the 
expanded model (which includes all analysts with significant 
contemporaneous correlation) has significantly more explanatory power 
than a univariate model including one analyst’s revisions.9 These 
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results, therefore, provide empirical support for the assumed notion 
that investors use forecasts of more than one analyst to determine 
equilibrium security prices. 
4.3 Results on Analyst Characteristics 
The third research hypothesis of this study proposes that the 
security price adjustment to a forecast revision is unrelated to 
measures of forecast uniqueness (UNIQ), analyst reputation (REPUT) or 
revision timing (TIME). Table 21 and Table 22 report the one-way 
ANCOVA results that examine the relationship between ECAR and each of 
these analyst characteristic measures. ECAR is measured using holding 
period [-1,0] and results are reported for all revisions (ALL REV) and 
good news/bad news subgroups [(+) REV/(-) REV].10 A total of 2,317 
individual analyst forecast revisions in 1980 and 2,385 in 1981 are 
used to estimated the F-values for each analyst characteristic measure 
(factor) and the four covariates. These revisions are a subset of the 
total number described in Table 1 and are obtained after excluding 
revisions that are smaller than the industry average revision for a 
given year. 
In Tables 21 and 22, the relative magnitude of the F-values 
across covariates and across factors is noteworthy. The four 
covariates differ widely in the strength of association with ECAR in 
each test year. The measured association between REV(1) and ECAR is 
significant only for the full revision sample in 1981, suggesting that 
noise in the revision data persists despite the use of industry 




ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE RESULTS 
F-Values and (Probabilities) 
All REV ( + ) REV (-) REV 
Factor: UNIQ 1.843 (.12) 1.953 (.10) .318 (.87) 
Covar: REV(1) .629 (.43) 4.232 (.04) .124 (.72) 
BETA 31.643 (.00) 7.192 (.01) 22.454 (.00) 
ALPHA 1.738 (.19) .813 (.37) 3.510 (.06) 
PRICE 3.319 (.07) 1.603 (.21) 13.712 (.00) 
Factor: REPUT 2.252 (.08) 1.682 (.17) 2.750 (.04) 
Covar: REV(1) .996 (.32) 4.789 (.03) .735 (.39) 
BETA 29-389 (.00) 7.729 (.01) 17.241 (.00) 
ALPHA 1.931 (.17) 1.733 (.19) 2.336 (.13) 
PRICE 3.885 (.05) 1.163 (.28) 14.425 (.00) 
Factor: TIME 15.162 (.00) 13. .560 (.00) 3. ,281 (.04) 
Covar: REV(1) 1.494 (.22) 1, .657 (.20) 4 .192 (.66) 
BETA 36.081 (.00) 9. .231 (.00) 24. .737 (.00) 
ALPHA 1.236 (.27) .474 (.49) 3. .151 (.08) 
PRICE 4.589 (.03) 1, .363 (.24) 15. .420 (.00) 
F-values for the factors and covariates (Covar) are calculated using 




ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE RESULTS 
F-Values and (Probabilities) 
All REV 
Factor: UNIQ 1.778 (.13) 
Covar: REV(1) 6.504 (.01) 
BETA 25.590 (.00) 
ALPHA 41.168 (.00) 
PRICE .727 (.39) 
Factor: REPUT 1.056 (.37) 
Covar: REV(1) 4.222 (.04) 
BETA 21.901 (.00) 
ALPHA 40.121 (.00) 
PRICE .079 (.78) 
Factor: TIME 4.100 (.02) 
Covar: REV(1) 7.364 (.01) 
BETA 31.664 (.00) 
ALPHA 24.848 (.00) 
PRICE .768 (.38) 
( + ) REV (>) REV 
.146 (.96) 2.373 (.05) 
1.740 (.19) .040 (.84) 
.528 (.47) 34.167 (.00) 
21.886 (.00) 21.960 (.00) 
1.313 (.25) 3.468 (.06) 
2.040 (.11) .311 (.82) 
2.793 (.10) .538 (.46) 
.681 (.41) 29.517 (.46) 
29.073 (.00) 18.582 (.00) 
3.290 (.07) 2.303 (.13) 
2.047 (.13) 7.367 (.00) 
2.087 (.15) .305 (.58) 
.008 (.93) 47.003 (.00) 
6.424 (.01) 15.945 (.00) 
.943 (.33) 3.590 (.06) 
F-values for the factors and covariates (Covar) are calculated using 
ECAR for holding period [-1,0] as the dependent variable. 
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ALPHA in 1981 indicate that there exists significant measurement error 
in the parameter estimates or that these parameter estimates proxy for 
another variable significantly associated with abnormal return 
measures. Furthermore, these results provide strong evidence that 
BETA and ALPHA should be used to control for this relationship in 
studies that evaluate the association between returns and other 
variables of interest. The PRICE variable contains significant 
explanatory power, over and above that of BETA and ALPHA, for 1980 and 
for the subgroup of downward revisions in 1981, supporting the results 
of Elgers, Callahan and Strock [1986]. 
For the analyst characteristic measures, TIME is significantly 
associated with ECAR after controlling for the four covariates. The 
F-value associated with TIME is significant at the .05 level for all 
samples in 1980 and for the samples of all revisions (All REV) and the 
subsample of downward revisions ((-) REV) in 1981. The F-values 
associated with UNIQ and REPUT, however, are not signifcant at 
conventional levels of significance in 1980 or 1981. 
Table 21 and 22 report only the significance of the association 
between proposed factors and ECAR. The cell means (AveCAR) for each 
of the one-way ANCOVA tests are reported in Table 23 in order to 
examine the observed pattern in cell means. 
One would expect investor response to an analyst’s revision to be 
positively related to UNIQ, as discussed in Section 3*8. While in 
most cases the cell mean is larger for the largest UNIQ quintile than 
for the smallest, the means are not monotonically increasing. This 
inconsistent relationship may be observed because of noise in the 
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Table 23 
Cell Means (AveCAR) and Probabilities (Prob.) 
for One-Way Analysis of Covariance 
1980 
(+) REVISIONS (-) REVISIONS 
Factor Ranking AveCAR Prob. AveCAR Prob. 
UNIQ 1 (most negative UNIQ1) -.21$ -.01$ 
2 .86 .26 
3 1.31 .29 
4 .90 .46 
5 (most positive UNIQ1) .24 (.10) -.08 (.87) 
REPUT 1 (highest perf. ranking) .39* .83$ 
2 .70 -.42 
3 1.07 -.04 
4 (lowest perf. ranking) -.12 (.17) -.16 (.04) 
TIME 2 (second quarter) 1.02$ .45$ 
3 -.88 -.37 












2 .92 -.12 
3 .52 .67 
4 .39 -.27 
5 (most positive UNIQ1) .48 (.96) -.43 (.05) 
REPUT 1 (highest perf. ranking) .44$ -.32* 
2 1.04 -.26 
3 -.41 -.37 
4 (lowest perf. ranking) 1.05 (.11) -.03 (.82) 
TIME 2 (second quarter) 1.20$ -1.09$ 
3 .74 .30 
4 (fourth quarter) .20 (.13) -.42 (.00) 
AveCARs are measured using ECAR and holding period [-1,0]. AveCARs 
are adjusted for the four covariates: REV(1), BETA, ALPHA and PRICE. 
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data. Because only a subset of all analysts following a firm provide 
forecasts to IBES, the times series of all analyst forecasts is 
unknown and UNIQ1 may be incorrectly measured. Possibly, a better 
proxy for uniqueness could be obtained if the forecasts of regional 
analysts were also considered. 
An inconsistent relationship between adjusted CARs and REPUT is 
also reported in Table 23. If differential price reaction to analyst 
revisions could be explained by differences in analyst reputation, one 
would expect market response to analyst forecasts to be more 
pronounced for the top REPUT quartile. This pattern is not observed 
in any of the subgroups. Because REPUT is based on the brokerage firm 
performance of the previous year, this lack of significance may be 
explained by inconsistent year-by-year performance, as suggested by 
Brown and Rozeff [1980]• Inconsistent patterns were also found in 
1980, however, when ex post performance rankings were used to measure 
REPUT. These findings suggest differential price response to analyst 
forecast revisions cannot be explained by reputation, as measured by 
the proxies used in this study.12 
The pattern of AveCAR observed in the three TIME categories is 
also inconsistent in 1980. For 1981, however, the AveCAR for the 
second quarter is largest for the upward revisions sample and most 
negative for the downward revision sample. This pattern is consistent 
with the findings of Imhoff and Lobo [1985] and suggests that the 
market response to analyst revisions made in the early part of the 
year may be more pronounced because investors have less access to 
other sources of information about firm earnings than they do later in 
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the fiscal year. 
Results for three-way analysis of covariance tests are presented 
in Table 24. By including UNIQ, REPUT and TIME in one model, the 
efficiency of the F-tests may be improved. The inferences from the 
one-way ANCOVA’s, however, are generally unchanged. By expanding the 
ANCOVA model to include all three analyst characteristics, UNIQ and 
REPUT increase in significance. The F-values associated with REPUT, 
however, are significant at the .05 level for only a select subsample 
in each of the test years. UNIQ is significantly related to ECAR in 
1980 and 1981 when all revisions are used to estimate the ANCOVA 
model. The association between UNIQ and ECAR, however, continues to 
be weaker than that reported for the TIME variable in Table 24. The 
F-values associated with TIME are significant at the .05 level for all 
samples in 1981 and for all but the subsample of downward revisions in 
1980. The three-way ANCOVA results, therefore, provide further 
evidence of a relationship between security price response to an 
analyst revision and the timing of the revision. 
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Table 24 
THREE-WAY ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE RESULTS 
F-Values and (Probabilities) 
All REV (+) REV (-) REV 
1980 Factor: UNIQ 2.342 (.05) 3.241 (.01) .513 (.73) 
REPUT 2.407 (.07) 2.001 (.11) 3.541 (.01) 
TIME 8.654 (.00) 9.095 (.00) 1.675 (.18) 
Covar: REV(1) .108 (.74) .128 (.72) .022 (.88) 
BETA 22.749 (.00) 4.404 (.04) 17.451 (.00) 
ALPHA .824 (.36) .083 (.77) 1.802 (.18) 
PRICE 5.436 (.02) .691 (.41) 15.390 (.00) 
1981 Factor: UNIQ 2.664 (.03) .183 (.95) 2.896 (.02) 
REPUT .327 (.81) 3.022 (.05) .143 (.93) 
TIME 4.722 (.01) 3.015 (.03) 6.158 (.00) 
Covar: REV(1) 2.235 (.13) 3.031 (.08) 2.945 (.09) 
BETA 20.202 (.00) .005 (.94) 30.970 (.00) 
ALPHA 24.175 (.00) 9.190 (.00) 12.843 (.00) 
PRICE .044 (.84) 1.365 (.24) 1.697 (.19) 
F-values for the factors and covariates (Covar) are calculated using 
ECAR for holding period [-1,0] as the dependent variable. 
All interaction effects were not significant in preliminary tests. 
For this reason and because interaction effects are not of primary 
concern in this study, interaction terms were not included in these 
three-way ANCOVA models. 
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Chapter 4 Endnotes 
The results for other holding periods are calculated but reveal 
no additional information about the pattern of market expectations. 
Because the consensus measures vary in the degree to which they meet 
data screens, the number of observations varies across the eight 
consensus sources. The number of "1-Month Mean” and n1-Month Median" 
observations is largely reduced by the data screen requiring at least 
three analysts to provide forecasts in a given month. In addition, 
only non-zero revisions are included in the consensus calculations 
shown in Tables 6,7,8 and 11. 
2 
Tables A2, A3, A 4 and A5 in Appendix A report the Spearman rank 
correlation coefficients for five holding periods using each of the 
four alternative CAR measures (VCAR, SCAR, MCAR and ACAR, 
respectively). These tables supplement Table 6 and permit a more 
detailed analysis of the sensitivity of the consensus results to 
alternative CAR measures. In Tables A2 through A5, the observed 
pattern in the Spearman correlations across holding periods is similar 
to that found using ECAR. For a given holding period, the relative 
magnitude of the Spearman correlations among the eight consensus 
sources is also similar using these alternative CAR measures to that 
reported for ECAR. 
3 
Table 10 indicates that revisions of the "Median of All" have 
marginal information content over the "Mean of All" in 1980. This 
finding suggests that investors apply less weight to outlying 
forecasts and contradicts the results of Brown, Foster and Noreen 
[1985]. This correlation is not significant in 1981, however, 
indicating that the manner in which outlying forecasts are 
incorporated in market expectations may be time specific. 
4 
Peterson and Peterson [1982] examine the relationship between 
beta and the coefficient of variation of analyst forecasts (CV) 
measured around the IBES "Mean of All". The coefficient of variation 
(SD/"Mean of All") was used by Peterson and Peterson as a deflated 
measure of divergence of opinion (DIVOP) in order to permit 
comparisons among firms and across time periods. To determine the 
sensitivity of their results to the consensus definition, the Pearson 
correlation between annual betas and average monthly CVs was 
calculated using both the "Mean of All" and the "1-Month Mean". These 
correlations (r(BETA, CV)) are as follows: 
1980 1981 
CV measured using: 
Mean of All .176 .189 
1-Month Mean .195 *256 
The correlations for CV measured using the "1-Month Mean" are larger 
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at both years than the correlations using the "Mean of All”. While 
the difference in correlations for each year is not significant, the 
correlations are calculated using only 100 firms that meet all 
necessary data requirements. To further examine the effect of 
outdated forecasts on 1170? measures such as CV, additional tests that 
include a larger cross-section of firms are warranted. 
"'Two holding periods, I—2,0“ and E-2,+1], are not reported as they 
reveal no additional information about the pattern in which individual 
analyst forecasts are incorporated in market expectations. 
- 
'ladles 32, S3, 34 and 35 in Appendix B report the Spearman rank 
correlation coefficients for five holding periods using each of the 
four alternative IAS measures (7CAS, SCAS, MCAR and ACAR, 
respectively . These tables supplement Table 14 and permit a more 
beta:leo analysis of the sensitivity of the individual analyst results 
to alternative CIS measures. In Table B2 through B5, the observed 
pattern an the Spearman correlations across holding periods is similar 
to tnat found using 30A?. For a given holding period, the relative 
nagn_tube of the Spearman correlations among the three analyst sources 
_s also sumnlar using these alternative CAR measures to that reported 
for Bill an 1930- In 1981, the rank ordering of the analyst sources 
case: on the magnitude of the Spearman correlation differs among the 
fiv® “A? measures, however, for all five CAR measures the differences 
_n tne '?:' correlations among analyst sources are small relative to 
TSfiD- 
In 1930. nigi inflation and high interest rates persisted 
tnrougnout the entire year, a situation largely anticipated by 
analysts Business Week, January 14, 1980, p. 52). The recession 
remittee nr most firm earnings experiencing limited real growth in 
'980. Tne unpredteatable economic recovery and the untested policies 
of Bresnnant ?eagar. however, made 1931 a "year full of uncertainties" 
Business »eex, January 12, 1981, p. 51)• While many firms 
erpe.nencec strong earnings early in 1981, most firms reported weaker 
sam_ngs numbers at the end of the year (Business Week, March 15, 
'932, pc. ~0-~2.). Tne uncertain economy of 1981 may have resulted 
In security price adjustments to earnings revisions to be more 
concentreteo around the revision date in 1981 than in 1980. 
5_ 
~TZT ' ns the revision variable selected to test both Hypothesis 
2 am Bypotnesls 3 because individual analyst forecast revisions are 
usee tc test men oypetneses and the results reported in Section 4.1.2 
nemonstrace teas provides an individual analyst revision 
vamaole tnat Is more strongly associated with abnormal returns than 
ESF2. Because tne results for Hypothesis 1A and IB were relatively 
unsensitdv* to tne 0A2 definition, test of Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 
2 are only reported for gCAB. 
for 
"in Tatles 'c, '9 2nd 20, the square of the correlation r(CAR,REV 
tne first identified "Market leader" does not exactly equal the R 
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of the restricted model. This is because only analyst revisions for 
firms followed by all other potential market leaders are used to 
estimate the restricted model. Alternatively, the correlation 
r(CAR,REV) is determined for all industry firms followed by that one 
analyst, regardless if the firm is followed by other analysts. 
10These analyst characteristics are hypothesized to distinquish 
between market leaders and followers. By definition, the response to 
market leaders1 revisions should be concentrated around the revision 
date. For this reason, ANCOVA results are presented using a shorter 
holding period, [-1,0]. Holding period [-1,0] is selected over 
holding period [0] to test the third hypothesis because preliminary 
results revealed weaker associations between ECAR[0] and REV(1) than 
between ECAR[-1,0] and REV(1) for the sample of analyst revisions used 
to estimate the ANCOVA models. 
^Industry filters is one method that can be used to reduce the 
total set of analyst revisions to a more manageable and less noisy 
set. This method is more appropriate than a single filter (e.g. 
REV(1) > .05 for all firms) because it takes into consideration the 
differences in earnings volatility across industries. All ANCOVA 
tests were also conducted using another screen: including only the 
revisions of analysts found to be market leaders in Section 4.2. For 
this subsample, the F-value associated with REV(1) was consistently 
and strongly significant, however, this screen resulted in relatively 
small cell sizes. Results are, therefore, reported for the filtered 
sample. The number of revisions varies for each ANCOVA test because 
of missing values for UNIQ and REPUT. 
12 
A size ranking of the analysts brokerage firm was also used to 
proxy for reputation. The results were similar for this definition as 
those reported in Table 21 through Table 24. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Overview of Results and Their Research Implications 
The purpose of this study is to examine the relative impact of 
earnings forecast revisions on security prices in 1980 and 1981. 
Based on tests of three research hypotheses using selected research 
design alternatives, the main findings of this study can be summarized 
as follows: 
(1) Security price changes are more consistent with the revisions of 
a "1-Month Mean" than the revisions of more commonly used 
consensus measures. Analyst forecasts that have not been revised 
within one month, therefore, appear to receive less weight than 
more current forecasts when investors adjust their expectations 
to analyst forecast revisions. The price adjustment to the 
consensus revisions are observed over the four-week period when 
individual analyst forecast revisions included in the consensus 
measure are disclosed. 
(2) The revisions of the "All-American*' analyst are significantly 
associated with abnormal security returns in both test years, 
unlike the revisions of other analyst sources that have been 
examined in previous studies. This finding suggests that the 
"All-American" analyst is more closely followed than other 
individual analysts during the analysis period. When comparing 
individual analysts, however, the observed differences in the 
101 
102 
information content measures are more pronounced in 1980 than in 
1981. In addition, the observed pattern in which prices adjust 
to individual analyst revisions differed between the two test 
years. 
(3) The forecast revisions of several analysts following a given 
industry have significant marginal information content over and 
above the revisions of a single, closely followed analyst. Using 
a multiple regression model, this study provides empirical 
evidence that suggests investors wait for confirmation of one 
analyst’s revision before fully adjusting security prices. 
(4) For the time period and sample of this study, market response to 
an analyst’s forecast revision is significantly related to the 
fiscal quarter in which the revision is made. In one of the two 
years examined, the observed pattern is consistent with previous 
studies that find stock price adjustments to forecast revisions 
more pronounced in the second quarter than in later quarters. 
By comparing alternative consensus and individual analyst 
revision measures, this study evaluates the quality of analyst 
forecasts as proxies for the unobservable market expectation of 
earnings. At the consensus level, the ”1-Month Mean” is the best 
single proxy for market expectations for this sample and time period. 
At the individual analyst level, the forecasts of the ’’All-American" 
provide the best proxy. The measures of association between analyst 
forecasts and security prices are shown to be quite sensitive to the 
choice of the analyst source in certain years. 
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These results suggest that the "1-Month Mean” or the 
"All-American” analyst should be used in future studies requiring a 
measure of market expectation of earnings. Because neither of these 
measures have been used in previous studies of information content, 
the observed association between unexpected earnings and security 
prices may be even stronger than previously reported. Use of these 
analyst sources as proxies for market expectations may, therefore, 
improve the reliability of inferences drawn from future research. 
The results of this study should be of interest to the growing 
number of researchers examining the relationship between analyst 
forecasts and security returns. This type of research requires that a 
large number of essentially arbitrary decisions must be made, all of 
which may influence the results. For this sample and test period, 
this study provides empirical evidence on the sensitivity of these 
results not only to the choice of the analyst source, but also to 
alternative earnings variable deflators, return holding periods, CAR 
measures and subsample classifications. The results of this study, 
therefore, provide empirical evidence that can be used as the basis 
for future research design decisions. Use of the measures recommended 
in this study will also make future studies more directly comparable. 
The implications of these results are not limited to information 
content studies. Research studies are using readily available 
consensus forecast measures (e.g. "Mean of All") to examine 
alternative risk measures (Malkiel [1982], Carvell and Strebel [1984], 
and Vander Weide and Carleton [1985]). These studies find that the 
standard deviation of analyst forecasts around the "Mean of All" is 
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more strongly associated with security returns than beta. By 
demonstrating that the "Mean of All" includes outdated forecasts, the 
results of this study indicate that the standard deviation of analyst 
forecasts around the "1-Month Mean" may provide a better proxy for 
divergence of opinion, and, therefore, a more suitable risk measure. 
There is also growing interest in using financial analyst 
forecasts (FAF) and discounted cash flow (DCF) models to estimate 
equity return requirements (Brigham, Shome and Vinson [1985] and 
Harris [1986]). Harris [1986] notes that: 
FAF also have been used in conjunction with DCF models by a 
number of expert witnesses in rate of return determinants 
for regulated utilities. Recently, the Federal 
Communications Commission tentatively endorsed the use of 
consensus FAF in DCF determinations of required return on 
equity. ...[In addition,] AT&T used an approach driven by 
FAF growth estimates from IBES.1 
Using expectation data such as the IBES consensus forecast to estimate 
the future growth rate required in DCF models is theoretically more 
appealing than using historical growth estimates. The results of this 
study, however, suggest that a "1-Month Mean" may be a more 
appropriate consensus measure. The effect of using this alternative 
consensus definition on the estimated required rate of return would, 
therefore, be of interest to investors and policy makers. 
The results of this study relating to the marginal information 
content of analyst forecasts and to analyst characteristics also have 
significance for public policy. The finding of significant marginal 
information content leads to further understanding of how multiple 
analyst forecast are incorporated to form a single estimate of future 
earnings. Such an understanding is necessary to evaluate the way 
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expectations would change to an increase in the amount of available 
information (e.g. resulting from a mandatory disclosure of management 
forecasts). Furthermore, the results of this study suggest that the 
impact of additional information on security returns would be 
dependent on the fiscal quarter in which the disclosure is made. 
5.2 Limitations 
As with any empirical study examining analyst forecasts, the 
limitations of this research are related to limitations of the 
forecast data. First, the potential existence of a reporting lag 
makes it impossible to determine the specific date when an analyst 
forecast revision was made available to investors. While weekly data 
and longer holding periods were used to address this event date 
uncertainty, these research procedures most likely reduced the 
efficiency of the tests. 
Secondly, not all security analysts making earnings forecasts for 
a given sample company are represented. Regional brokerage firms and 
company research departments develop earnings forecasts that are not 
included in the IBES reports. The "consensus” earnings forecasts and 
the uniqeness measures (UNIQ1) used in this study, therefore, may not 
be the same measures that would be derived if one had access to all 
forecasts made for each sample firm. Future research is needed to 
determine the effect of these limitations on the inferences drawn from 
secondary sources of forecast data. 
The large data requirements of this study result in only large, 
highly followed firms to be included in this analysis. The findings 
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of this study may, therefore, only apply to firms that are closely 
monitored by the analyst community. As similar data screens have been 
used in most forecast studies, future research should be directed 
toward examining how analysts' earnings forecasts are used by 
investors when only a limited number of forecasts are provided. 
Data availability further restricted the time period over which 
this analysis was conducted. The results of this study, therefore, 
may not be applicable to time periods other than 1980 and 1981. 
Additional years of data would allow one to examine the sensitivity of 
the results of this study to alternative market conditions. 
Furthermore, a longer time series would enable the consistency of a 
market leader to be more thoroughly evaluated. 
5.3 Suggestions for Future Research 
In addition to reexamining the research hypotheses of this study 
using additional forecast data, there are three areas where future 
research should be directed. One area would be the use of the 
"1-Month Mean" to replicate studies that have exclusively employed the 
"Mean of All" to proxy for market expectations. Alternative risk 
measures that employ the standard deviation of analyst forecasts 
around the "1-Month Mean" should be examined to determine the 
sensitivity of these risk measures to outdated analyst forecasts. Use 
of divergence of opinion measures, for example, that exclude outdated 
forecasts may permit a more complete analysis of the relationship 
between measures of security risk and return. Similarly, the "1-Month 
Mean" should be used in discounted cash flow models to determine the 
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sensitivity of the required rate of return measures to the consensus 
definition. By using a consensus measure that better proxies for 
market expectations, these tests may provide additional insight to the 
appropriate specification and estimation of current equilibrium 
models. 
A second direction for future research is the development of more 
sophisticated methods for identifying a market leading analyst and for 
measuring marginal information content. The univariate and multiple 
regression models used here, though highly simplistic, were able to 
distinguish some analysts as leaders and others as laggers. Because 
of limited degrees of freedom, however, the power of the tests for 
marginal information content was weak. Much more work needs to be 
done in order to more fully understand how investors use competing 
analyst forecasts to determine equilibrium security price. In 
addition, a more complete model that includes individual analyst 
forecasts and other forecast measures (e.g. management forecasts) 
needs to be developed. 
A final area warranting future research is the relationship 
between forecast accuracy and information content. Over time it is 
expected that the analyst providing the most accurate forecasts will 
be most closely followed by investors. While the results of this 
study indicate that the forecast revisions of some analysts lead the 
market, there is no evidence on the accuracy of the market leaders’ 
forecasts relative to the forecasts of other analysts. With the 
reported inconsistency in analyst forecast accuracy (Brown and Rozeff 
[1980]), further tests are needed to determine whether the most 
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closely followed analyst is also the most accurate or whether analyst 
reputation lags forecast accuracy. 
In summary, in order to understand how multiple sources of 
analyst forecasts are used by investors, research must be conducted at 
the individual analyst level. The results of this dissertation, made 
possible by more extensive forecast data, provide initial evidence on 
the relative information content of alternative analyst forecasts. It 
is hoped that these results caution researchers in using ready-made 
consensus forecasts as proxies for market expectations and serve as a 
guide for more definitive tests examining earnings forecasts. 
Chapter 5 Endnotes 
1 
R. S. Harris, "Using Analysts' Growth Forecasts to Estimate 
Shareholder Required Rates of Return," Financial Management (Spring 
1986), p. 60. 
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CONSENSUS CORRELATION RESULTS 
USING ALTERNATIVE HOLDING PERIODS 
FULL SAMPLE 
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients and (Probabilities) 
Between ECAR and REV(1) 
Alternative Holding Periods 
Consensus 
Year Source [0] Iz.?i .PL ■ IzL0] [-7.0] [-2,+1] Numob. 
Mean of All .01 (.36) -.03 (.15) .01 (.25) .10 (.00) .01 (.31) 1694 
1-Month Mean .02 (.26) .01 (.37) .02 (.29) .04 (.10) .05 (.08) 819 
2-Month Mean -.01 (.42) -.00 (.50) • 03 (.14) .08 (.00) .03 (.14) 1440 
3-Month Mean .01 (.33) .01 (.35) .04 (.05) .06 (.00) .04 (.04) 1633 
Median of All .02 (.20) -.01 (.35) .03 (.15) .12 (.00) .02 (.18) 1218 
1-Month Median .00 (.47) -.02 (.32) .00 (.49) .06 (.04) -.00 (.46) 771 
2-Month Median .00 (.45) .02 (.23) .03 (.17) .10 (.00) .04 (.09) 1228 
3-Month Median .02 (.22) .00 (.47) • 03 (.17) .06 (.01) .04 (.10) 1298 
Mean of All .06 (.01) .02 (.26) .07 (.00) .16 (.00) -.01 (.39) 1418 
1-Month Mean .06 (.04) .02 (.30) .10 (.00) .18 (.00) -.00 (.47) 827 
2-Month Mean .06 (.02) .01 (.34) .07 (.00) .18 (.00) -.01 (.37) 1302 
3-Month Mean .09 (.00) .03 (.15) .07 (.00) .17 (.00) .01 (.40) 1398 
Median of All .10 (.00) .04 (.11) .07 (.01) .20 (.00) .01 (.31) 1061 
1-Month Median .04 (.11) .00 (.48) .07 (.00) .15 (.00) -.03 (.19) 786 
2-Month Median .05 (.05) .02 (.23) .05 (.04) .19 (.00) .01 (.42) 1121 
3-Month Median .10 (.00) .05 (.05) .07 (.01) .20 (.00) .02 (.19) 1145 
Numob. = Number of observations 
All abnormal returns are measured using equal-weighted market model parameter estimates 
(ECAR). All consensus forecast revisions are deflated by the absolute value of the 
previous consensus forecast (REV(1)). 
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Table A2 
CONSENSUS CORRELATION RESULTS 
USING ALTERNATIVE HOLDING PERIODS 
FULL SAMPLE 
Speannan Rank Correlation Coefficients and (Probabilities) 
Between VCAR and REV(2) 





1980 Mean of All 
1- Month Mean 
2- Month Mean 





























Median of All .01 (.38) .02 (.22) .06 (.02) .12 (.00) .03 (.16) 1218 
1-Month Median -.03 (.21) -.02 (.26) .02 (.33) .08 (.02) -.01 (.37) 771 
2-Month Median -.02 (.19) .04 (.10) .04 (.09) .10 (.00) .04 (.07) 1228 
3-Month Median .00 (.43) .03 (.14) .05 (.05) .08 (.00) .04 (.07) 1298 
Mean of All .07 (.00) .06 (.02) .12 (.00) .24 (.00) .04 (.08) 1418 
1-Month Mean .08 (.01) .05 (.07) .15 (.00) .23 (.00) .04 (.14) 827 
2-Month Mean .06 (.01) .04 (.10) .12 (.00) .25 (.00) .01 (.30) 1302 
3-Month Mean .08 (.00) .05 (.04) .11 (.00) .23 (.00) .03 (.14) 1398 
Median of All .09 (.00) .08 (.00) .13 (.00) .26 (.00) .05 (.04) 1061 
1-Month Median .08 (.01) .07 (.02) .15 (.00) .23 (.00) .05 (.09) 786 
2-Month Median .05 (.04) .04 (.08) .10 (.00) .24 (.00) .03 (.13) 1121 
3-Month Median .09 (.00) .07 (.01) .11 (.00) .24 (.00) .05 (.04) 1145 
Numob. = Number of observations 
All abnormal returns are measured using value—weighted market model parameter estimates 
(VCAR). All consensus forecast revisions are deflated by the standard deviation 
measured around the associated consensus forecast (REV(2)). 
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Table A3 
CONSENSUS CORRELATION RESULTS 
USING ALTERNATIVE HOLDING PERIODS 
FULL SAMPLE 
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients and (Probabilities) 
Between SCAR and REV(2) 
Alternative Holding Periods 
Year 
Consensus 
Source CO] [-2,0] C-3,0] [-7.0] [-2.+1] Numob. 
1980 
1981 
Mean of All .01 (.36) -.01 (.37) .03 (.15) .12 (.00) .02 (.19) 1694 
1-Month Mean .02 (.30) .01 (.41) .03 (.17) .08 (.01) .04 (.10) 819 
2-Month Mean -.01 (.39) .01 (.37) .04 (.08) .09 (.00) .04 (.09) 1440 
3-Month Mean .00 (.44) .01 (.27) .04 (.05) .08 (.00) .04 (.05) 1633 
Median of All .03 (.17) .01 (.34) .06 (.02) .14 (.00) .03 (.12) 1218 
1-Month Median .00 (.49) -.01 (.43) .03 (.23) .10 (.00) .00 (.47) 771 
2-Month Median .00 (.39) .03 (.13) .05 (.04) .12 (.00) .05 (.03) 1228 
3-Month Median .03 (.13) .03 (.15) .05 (.04) .09 (.00) .05 (.03) 1298 
Mean of All .06 (.01) .04 (.05) .10 (.00) .20 (.00) .02 (.19) 1418 
1-Month Mean .06 (.03) .04 (.12) .12 (.00) .19 (.00) .02 (.23) 827 
2-Month Mean .06 (.02) .03 (.17) .09 (.00) .21 (.00) -.00 (.49) 1302 
3-Month Mean .07 (.00) .04 (.07) .09 (.00) .19 (.00) .02 (.26) 1398 
Median of All .08 (.00) .06 (.02) .10 (.00) .23 (.00) .04 (.13) 1061 
1-Month Median .07 (.03) .06 (.05) .12 (.00) .20 (.00) .03 (.18) 786 
2-Month Median .04 (.08) .03 (.15) .07 (.01) .21 (.00) .01 (.32) 1121 
3-Month Median .08 (.00) .06 (.02) .09 (.00) .21 (.00) .04 (.10) 1145 
Numob. = Number of observations 
All abnormal returns are standardized and use equal-weighted market model parameter 
estimates (SCAR). All consensus forecast revisions are deflated by the standard 
deviation measured around the associated consensus forecast (REV(2)). 
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Table A4 
CONSENSUS CORRELATION RESULTS 
USING ALTERNATIVE HOLDING PERIODS 
FULL SAMPLE 
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients and (Probabilities) 
Between MCAR and REV(2) 
Alternative Holding Periods 
Consensus 
Year Source CO] [-2.0] [-3 1.0] [-7,0] [-2,-1] Numob. 
1980 Mean of All -.01 1 [.30) -.02 1 (.24) .01 (.29) .11 (.00) -.00 (.46) 1694 
1-Month Mean -.01 l (.43) -.01 i (.43) .03 (.21) .06 (.03) .03 (.18) 819 
2-Month Mean -.03 1 Ml) .00 1 (.50) .03 (.12) .08 (.00) .01 (.31) 1440 
3-Month Mean -.02 1 (.24) .01 1 (.40) .04 (.09) .07 (.00) .02 (.20) 1633 
Median of All .01 (.38) .00 (.43) .05 (.05) .13 (.00) .02 (.29) 1218 
1-Month Median -.02 (.29) -.02 (.26) .02 (.28) .09 (.01) -.01 (.37) 771 
2-Month Median -.01 (.38) .04 (.11) .04 (.08) .11 (.00) .04 (.08) 1228 





(.00) .03 (.11) 1298 
1981 Mean of All .06 (.01) .05 (.03) .11 (.00) .23 (.00) .03 (.12) 1418 
1-Month Mean .07 (.02) .04 (.10) .14 (.00) .22 (.00) .03 (.16) 827 
2-Month Mean .05 (.02) .02 (.18) .10 (.00) .24 (.00) .01 (.37) 1302 
3-Month Mean .07 (.00) .04 (.07) .10 (.00) .22 (.00) .02 (.20) 1398 
Median of All .08 (.00) .08 (.00) .12 (.00) .26 (.00) .05 (.04) 1061 
1-Month Median .07 (.02) .07 (.03) .14 (.00) .21 (.00) .04 (.11) 786 
2-Month Median .04 (.07) .04 (.10) .09 (.00) .23 (.00) .03 (.14) 1121 
3-Month Median .08 (.00) .07 (.01) .10 (.00) .23 (.00) .05 (.05) 1145 
Numob. = Number of observations 
All abnormal returns are mean-corrected and use equal-weighted market model parameter 
estimates (MCAR). All consensus forecast revisions are deflated by the standard 
deviation measured around the associated consensus forecast (REV(2)). 
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Table A5 
CONSENSUS CORRELATION RESULTS 
USING ALTERNATIVE HOLDING PERIODS 
FULL SAMPLE 
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients and (Probabilities) 
Between ACAR and REV(2) 
Alternative Holding Periods 
Consensus 
Year Source [0]_ [-2,0] [-3,0] [-7,0] [-2,+1] Numob. 
Mean of All .01 (.34) .00 (.46) .04 (.05) .14 (.00) .04 (.05) 1694 
1-Month Mean .02 (.27) .01 (.34) .04 (.11) .09 (.00) .06 (.04) 819 
2-Month Mean -.01 (.42) .01 (.29) .05 (.04) .10 (.00) .05 (.04) 1440 
3-Month Mean .00 (.47) .02 (.17) .05 (.02) .10 (.00) .06 (.01) 1633 
Median of All .03 (.17) .02 (.22) .07 (.01) .16 (.00) .06 (.02) 1218 
1-Month Median .01 (.42) -.00 (.48) .03 (.18) .11 (.00) .02 (.32) 771 
2-Month Medism .01 (.32) .05 (.04) .06 (.03) .14 (.00) .07 (.01) 1228 
3-Month Median .03 (.12) .04 (.10) .06 (.02) .11 (.00) .07 (.01) 1298 
Mean of All .06 (.01) .04 (.08) .10 (.00) .20 (.00) .02 (.21) 1418 
1-Month Mean .07 (.03) .03 (.18) .12 (.00) .19 (.00) .02 (.27) 827 
2-Month Mean .06 (.02) .02 (.28) .09 (.00) .21 (.00) -.00 (.45) 1302 
3-Month Mean .08 (.00) .03 (.16) .08 (.00) .18 (.00) .01 (.37) 1398 
Median of All .09 (.00) .06 (.02) .11 (.00) .24 (.00) .04 (.10) 1061 
1-Month Median .07 (.02) .05 (.07) .13 (.00) .21 (.00) .03 (.17) 786 
2-Month Median .04 (.07) .02 (.22) .07 (.01) .21 (.00) .01 (.31) 1121 
3-Month Median .08 (.00) .05 (.05) .08 (.00) .17 (.00) .03 (.14) 1145 
Numob. = Number of observations 
All abnormal returns are measured using equal-weighted market model parameter estimates 
and are adjusted for measurement error and empirical anomalies (ACAR). All consensus 
forecast revisions are deflated by the standard deviation measured around the associated 
consensus forecast (REV(2)). 
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INDIVIDUAL ANALYST CORRELATION RESULTS 
USING ALTERNATIVE HOLDING PERIODS 
FULL SAMPLE 
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients and (Probabilities) 
Between ECAR and REV(2) 
Alternative Holding Periods 
Analyst 
Year Source [ 0 ] [-1. 0] [-3. 0] C-7, 0] [0, +1] Numob 
1980 First .02 (.30) -.00 (.47) .04 (.21) .12 (.00) .03 (.28) 467 
Largest -.01 (.44) -.01 (.40) -.01 (.38) -.01 (.40) .02 (.34) 451 
All-American .04 (.21) .08 (.03) .08 (.03) .14 (.00) .04 (.16) 496 
1981 First .07 (.07) .03 (.25) .10 (.02) .22 (.00) .05 (.13) 452 
Largest .10 (.01) .04 (.22) .01 (.45) .22 (.00) .06 (.09) 447 
All-American .05 (.15) .03 (.22) .08 (.04) .20 (.00) .05 (.11) 496 
Numob. = Number of observations 
All abnormal returns are measured using equal-weighted market model parameter estimates 
(ECAR). All Individual analyst forecast revisions are deflated by the standard 




INDIVIDUAL ANALYST CORRELATION RESULTS 
USING ALTERNATIVE HOLDING PERIODS 
FULL SAMPLE 
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients and (Probabilities) 
Between VCAR and REV(1) 
Alternative Holding Periods 
Analyst 
Year Source [ 0 ] C-1 r 01 C-3 It 0] C-7 0] [0, +1] Numob 
1980 First .01 (.42) -.02 (.37) .00 (.47) .06 (.10) .01 ( :-39) 467 
Largest -.04 (.19) -.09 (.02) -.07 (.06) -.05 (.13) -.03 1 (.29) 451 
All-American .07 (.07) .12 (.00) .07 (.07) .12 (.00) -.01 (.38) 496 
1981 First • 13 (.00) .08 (.04) .13 (.00) .26 (.00) .09 < (.03) 452 
Largest .12 (.01) .10 (.02) .06 (.11) .24 (.00) .09 < (.03) 447 
All-American .09 (.02) .07 (.07) .12 (.00) .21 (.00) .11 1 (.01) 496 
Numob. = Number of observations 
All abnormal returns are measured using value-weighted market model parameter estimates 
(VCAR). All individual analyst forecast revisions are deflated by the absolute value 
of the analyst's previous forecast (REV(1)). 
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Table B3 
INDIVIDUAL ANALYST CORRELATION RESULTS 
USING ALTERNATIVE HOLDING PERIODS 
FULL SAMPLE 
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients and (Probabilities) 
Between SCAR and REV(1) 
Alternative Holding Periods 
Analyst 
Year Source [ 0 1 C-1. 0] C-3, o] [-7» 0] [0, +1] Numob. 
1980 First .04 (.19) .02 (.33) 
Largest -.03 (.27) -.04 (.20) 
All-American .07 (.07) .11 (.01) 
1981 First .09 (.03) .04 (.19) 
Largest .13 (.00) .08 (.04) 
All-American .07 (.05) .06 (.10) 
02 (. .37) .05 (. .16) .03 (.26) 467 
02 ( .34) -.02 ( .33) .00 (.50) 451 
08 (. .05) .11 (. .01) .03 (.25) 496 
08 (. .05) .22 (. .00) .03 (.26) 452 
04 (. .23) .23 (. ,00) .09 (.03) 447 
10 (. .02) .18 (. .00) .09 (.02) 496 
Numob. = Number of observations 
All abnormal returns are standardized and use equal-weighted market model parameter 
estimates (SCAR). All individual analyst forecast revisions are deflated by the 
absolute value of the analyst's previous forecast (REV(1)). 
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Table B4 
INDIVIDUAL ANALYST CORRELATION RESULTS 
USING ALTERNATIVE HOLDING PERIODS 
FULL SAMPLE 
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients and (Probabilities) 
Between MCAR and REV(1) 
Alternative Holding Periods 
Year 
Analyst 
Source C 0 ] C-1 ̂ 0] 
1980 First .01 (.39) -.01 (.44) 
Largest -.05 (.17) -.07 (.06) 
All-American .05 (.13) .11 (.01) 
1981 First .12 (.00) .07 (.07) 
Largest .12 (.01) .10 (.02) 
All-American .08 (.03) .06 (.10) 
r-3 1. o] [-7 , 0] -L0*. +1] Numob 
.01 (.41) .08 (.04) .01 (.42) 467 
-.06 (.09) -.07 (.07) -.03 (.27) 451 
.07 (.06) .13 (.00) -.01 (.38) 496 
.13 (.00) .25 (.00) .07 (.06) 452 
.05 (.13) .24 (.00) .08 (.04) 447 
.10 (.01) .21 (.00) .09 (.02) 496 
Numob. = Number of observations 
All abnormal returns are mean-corrected and ^se equ^"”ei®^®gi^keareIDdeflatedrb^ the 
estimates (MCAR). All individual analyst forecast revision, 
absolute value of the analyst's previous forecast (REVU;J. 
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Table B5 
INDIVIDUAL ANALYST CORRELATION RESULTS 
USING ALTERNATIVE HOLDING PERIODS 
FULL SAMPLE 
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients and (Probabilities) 
Between ACAR and REV(1) 
Alternative Holding Periods 
Analyst 
Year Source C 0 ] [-1 r 01 f-3 !, 0] [-7, 0] [0, + 1] Numob 
1980 First .04 (.21) .02 (.34) .04 (.18) .12 (.01) .03 ( :.28) 467 
Largest -.01 (.38) -.03 (.29) -.00 (.46) -.01 (.42) .01 1 :.45) 451 
All-American .07 (.06) .12 (.01) .08 (.04) .15 (.00) .03 ( :.24) 496 
1981 First .12 (.01) .06 (.09) .11 (.01) .26 (.00) .09 1 [.03) 452 
Largest .12 (.01) .08 (.04) .03 (.29) .22 (.00) .10 (.02) 447 
All-American .10 (.02) .07 (.06) .10 (.01) .19 (.00) .12 1 : .oo) 496 
Numob. = Number of observations 
All abnormal returns are measured using equal-weighted market model parameter estimates 
and are adjusted for measurement error and empirical anomalies (ACAR). All individual 
analyst forecast revisions are deflated by the absolute value of the analyst's previous 
forecast (REV(1)). 
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